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ARTICLES 
 
Reviving Proxy Marriage 
Andrea B. Carroll† 
Ask people to identify the most important event in their lives 
and their answers bear an overwhelming resemblance. The day of 
their marriage ranks near the top of the list for virtually all.1 Entry 
into the marital relationship is a decision we approach with much 
contemplation and reflection.2 Typically, the decision is not made 
whimsically. Indeed, popular culture has admonished us that “only 
fools rush in,” a virtual axiom in today’s society.3 Nonetheless, 
American states recognize without exception that marriage is merely 
a contract.4 It creates myriad rights and responsibilities5—essentially 
  
 † C.E. Laborde, Jr., Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, Paul M. 
Hebert Law Center. I thank Katherine Spaht, Keith Rowley, and the participants at 
the University of Nevada, Las Vegas School of Law 2010 Spring Conference on 
Contracts, and Barbara Glesner Fines and the participants at the 2010 North 
American Regional Meeting of the International Society of Family Law for valuable 
feedback on earlier drafts of this piece. I am also grateful to the LSU Law Center for its 
generous research support. Casey Faucon (LSU Law Center Class of 2010) and Laura 
Pryor (LSU Law Center Class of 2011) provided excellent research assistance. 
 1 See Andrew Sullivan, Why the M Word Matters to Me, TIME (Feb. 8, 2004), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101040216-588877,00.html.  
 2 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 
84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1254-55 (1998).  
 3 ELVIS PRESLEY, Fools Rush In, on ELVIS NOW (RCA Records 1971); DECADE 
BY DECADE 1940S: TEN YEARS OF POPULAR HITS ARRANGED FOR EASY PIANO 49 (crediting 
songwriter Johnny Mercer as the author of the song popularized by Elvis Presley). For 
use of the phrase dating back to the early twentieth century, see also Alexander Pope, An 
Essay on Criticism, in THE RAPE OF THE LOCK AND OTHER POEMS OF ALEXANDER POPE 70, 
90 (Macmillan Co. 1921) (“For fools rush in where Angels fear to tread.”). 
 4 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 4 (2009). See generally E. SCHILLEBEECKX, 
MARRIAGE: HUMAN REALITY AND SAVING MYSTERY 388 (1965) (contractual basis of 
marriage came from the Roman consensus idea of marriage adopted by the Roman 
Catholic Church). 
 5 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 1 (2009); see also Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and 
Quasi Rents; Or, I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 272 
(1987) (“Even seemingly vague and poetic marriage vows imply, yet conceal, a set of 
rights and obligations that are generally understood by the parties.”). 
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conferring a status6—but the parties’ relationship is, at base, nothing 
more than a contractual one. 
Still, modern society has elevated the marriage contract above 
all others. This distinction has focused overwhelmingly on the very 
personal nature of the marital relationship, a feature nonexistent in 
the arms-length contractual dealings with which we are accustomed 
to working when applying contract law.7 As a result, marriage is 
subject to a number of requirements, even at the level of contractual 
formation, that are unknown to the general law of contract.8 With the 
exception of the thirteen American jurisdictions allowing common law 
marriage,9 spouses must participate in person in a formal marriage 
ceremony at which they express their free consent and affirm their 
intent to undertake the marital relationship, with all the rights and 
duties it entails.10 To solidify the union, a solemn ceremony is 
typically required: a qualified officiant must preside11 and witnesses 
must be present.12 No other contract is subjected to as high an entry 
  
 6 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 2 (2009) (“Marriage is generally considered a civil 
contract differing in notable respects from ordinary contracts, but it is also and 
specially a status or personal relation in which the state is deeply concerned and over 
which the state exercises exclusive dominion.”).  
 7 Id.; 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 3 (6th ed. 1881) 
(“While the contract remains a mere agreement to marry, it is not essentially different 
from other executory contracts. . . . But when it is executed in what the law accepts as 
a valid marriage, its nature as a contract is merged in the higher nature of the 
status.”); see also Scott & Scott, supra note 2, at 1248. See generally Maynard v. Hill, 
125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
 8 See Scott & Scott, supra note 2, at 1289; see also Bishop v. Britain Inv. Co., 
129 S.W. 668, 676 (Mo. 1910) (“[W]hile we speak of marriage as a civil contract, yet that is 
a narrow view of it. The consensus of opinion in civilized nations is that marriage is 
something more than a dry contract. It is a contract different from all others.”). 
 9 A common law marriage is a marriage between two people who did not 
obtain a marriage license nor solemnize their union by formal ceremony. Although 
state laws vary, it generally requires the mutual consent of the parties to the marriage, 
cohabitation, and a public declaration that the parties are husband and wife. E.g., 
Hurley v. Hurley, 721 P.2d 1279, 1284 (Mont. 1986). Common law marriage is 
permitted in Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and the District of Columbia. 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-109.5 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1.1 (West 2003); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-403 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (2010); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 20-1-360 (1976); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (West 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 30-1-4.5 (LexisNexis 2007); Hoage v. Murch Bros. Constr. Co., 50 F.2d 983, 985-86 
(D.C. Cir. 1931); Wall v. Williams, 11 Ala. 826 (1847); Gammelgaard v. Gammelgaard, 
77 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1956); Smith v. Smith, 165 P.2d 593 (Kan. 1946). 
 10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAW § 283 (1971).  
 11 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:202 (2008) (“A marriage ceremony may be 
performed by (1) A priest, minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, or 
any clergyman of any religious sect, who is authorized by the authorities of his religion 
to perform marriages, and who is registered to perform marriages; (2) A state judge or 
justice of the peace.”). 
 12 State law varies on the number of witnesses required to perfect a 
ceremonial marriage. For example, Arizona requires two witnesses, while Connecticut 
does not require any witnesses so long as the officiant is qualified or the parties 
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requirement.13 Moreover, the application of one of the most 
fundamental doctrines of contract law—namely, that a contracting 
party need not formally enter into the contractual relationship 
himself but may instead designate an agent to act on his behalf14—is 
generally viewed as inapplicable to the marital relationship.15 So-
called proxy marriages, then—in which one party authorizes an agent 
to stand in his stead at the marriage ceremony—are widely disdained 
in the United States.16 
Agency theory, we say, is simply not well suited to application 
in the marital context.17 Thus, a proxy marriage is not a valid 
marriage at all in most states.18 Only five American states have 
recognized otherwise, and nearly all in an exceptionally narrow 
context involving military personnel.19 So serious is the contempt for 
proxy marriage that the doctrine has been rejected throughout most 
of this country for almost seventy years.20 But things have changed, 
and it is time to reevaluate the efficacy and equity of distinguishing 
between marriage and all other contractual relationships to which 
agency theory applies.  
Society has evolved in a much more mobile direction.21 Its 
members more often find themselves separated by great distances, by 
different means, and for different reasons than they did in the past.22 
Thousands of couples desiring to marry are unable to fulfill 
ceremonial marriage requirements because active military service 
  
reasonably believe him to be. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-125 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 46b-24 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).  
 13 But see Comments, 15 TUL. L. REV. 436, 436 (1941) (describing elaborate 
ceremonial procedures for transferring title to real property in medieval times; such 
form requirements no longer exist today). 
 14 1 FLOYD RUSSELL MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 80 (2d 
ed. 1914). 
 15 Id. §§ 124, 126. 
 16 Emily Post, The Day of the Wedding, in ETIQUETTE: THE BLUE BOOK OF 
SOCIAL USAGE ch. 26 (1937); see also Marvin M. Moore, The Case for Proxy Marriage, 
11 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 313, 313 (1962).  
 17 MECHEM, supra note 14, § 126. 
 18 See id. §§ 124, 126; see also 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 15 (2009) (“Under the 
law of some states, parties cannot be married by proxy. In such states the personal presence 
of both the bride and the groom at the marriage rites is essential to the proper 
solemnization of the marriage, and a marriage by proxy is invalid as a ceremonial 
marriage.”). 
 19 CAL. FAM. CODE § 420 (West. Supp. 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-
109 (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-301 (2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.006 
(West 2006); 80 Op. Att’y Gen. 261, 1980 WL 117668 (Kan. A.G.) (1980). 
 20 NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 
154 (2000).  
 21 See DAVID J. ELAZAR, BUILDING CITIES IN AMERICA: URBANIZATION AND 
SUBURBANIZATION IN A FRONTIER SOCIETY 16 (1987) (describing the “nomadism” of the 
American people as one of the hallmarks of American life); Richard Briffault, Our 
Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 413 (1990).  
 22 See John S. Broadway, Legalizing Proxy Marriages, 21 U. KAN. CITY L. 
REV. 111, 112-14 (1952). See generally Briffault, supra note 21. 
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makes travel impossible.23 Far more often these days, other 
employment commitments require one party to live away from home, 
making personal participation in a marriage ceremony impossible or 
impracticable.24 For example, in what was perhaps the highest profile 
proxy marriage attempted in the United States, a Russian cosmonaut 
working while orbiting Earth aboard the International Space Station 
in 2003 married his Texan bride by proxy through the use of an agent 
standing in for him at NASA.25 Same-sex partners around the 
country, who may now legally marry in six American jurisdictions,26 
might avoid the cost and other significant burdens of traveling to a 
state permitting same-sex marriage by appointing proxies and 
remaining in their home state.27 In each of these situations, denying 
parties who strongly wish to take on the contractual obligations of 
marriage deprives them—and, worse still, their children—of the 
many personal and property rights afforded to married persons.28 
Perhaps more importantly, the law has evolved as well. 
Agency theories, once relegated almost exclusively to commercial 
transactions,29 now apply to scores of personal dealings. As a result of 
legal developments in the last thirty years, one can, among other 
  
 23 Broadway, supra note 22, at 114; Moore, supra note 16, at 313. 
 24 See Briffault, supra note 21, at 413. See, e.g., Government Jobs Overview, 
FED. JOBS NETWORK, http://federaljobs.net.overview.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) 
(“Many federal workers’ duties require travel away from their duty station to attend 
meetings, complete training, or perform inspections while others—such as auditors, 
instructors, field engineering crews, and safety investigators—may require extensive 
travel for weeks or months at a time. Some employees are on continuous travel . . . .”). 
 25 James Oberg, Cosmonaut in World’s First Space Wedding, MSNBC.COM (Aug. 
12, 2003), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3077947. Internationally, many of history’s most 
famous couples were married by proxy. Napoleon married Maria Louisa by proxy in 1810 
with an archduke performing his role. 2 JOHN S.C. ABBOTT, THE HISTORY OF NAPOLEON 
BONAPARTE 172 (1855). Marie Antoinette and King Louis XVI were also married by proxy. 
JEANNE-LOUISE HENRIETTE CAMPAN, MEMOIRS OF MARIE ANTOINETTE 38-39 (1910). 
 26 Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and the 
District of Columbia allow marriages between same-sex partners. N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 457-A:1 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201-07 (2007); D.C. CODE § 32-701(3) 
(2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. 
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 
(Mass. 2003). In addition, the tribal law of the Coquille Indian Tribe in Oregon permits 
same-sex marriage. COQUILLE INDIAN TRIBAL CODE § 740.010(2) (2008).  
 27 See Kevin Lavery, Online Gay Marriage Seen as Game-Changer, NPR.ORG 
(Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121283017 
(describing the serious economic boon that might be fostered if states allowing gay 
marriage allowed parties to seek marriage licenses online); see also Adam Candeub & 
Mae Kuykendall, E-Marriage: Breaking the Marriage Monopoly (MSU Legal Studies 
Research, Working Paper No. 07-25, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1491704. 
 28 See infra Part III.A.2. 
 29 MECHEM, supra note 14, § 10 (“If agency be deemed to belong to contractual 
representation properly, it will at once be seen that it belongs to a condition of society in 
which commercial transactions are highly developed. A non-commercial society, while it 
might have much use for servants, would have little need of agents. The historical 
condition seems to accord with this conclusion.”). 
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things, appoint an agent to make end-of-life decisions,30 appoint an 
agent to draft a will,31 even appoint an agent to exercise custody over 
one’s child.32 In other words, agency doctrine has permeated the most 
personal of our relationships, save the marital relationship. 
The time has come to reassess our long-standing intolerance 
of proxy marriage. To that end, Part I of this article surveys the 
history of proxy marriage, from early Roman times to today, with a 
view toward providing an explanation for the doctrine’s negative 
perception in both the United States and abroad. Part II describes the 
reluctance to sanction proxy marriage based on the theory that 
agency law is not properly extended to exceptionally personal 
transactions. In addition, it challenges the assumption that marriage 
is too personal to be governed by agency principles given agency law’s 
application to other intimate dealings. Part III details, from an 
equitable standpoint, why proxy marriage is needed in today’s mobile 
society and argues that existing protective mechanisms inherent in 
agency law can ensure the continued integrity of proxy marriages. 
Finally, Part IV argues that it is time to stop singling out the marital 
contract as unworthy of an agency regime; a widespread revival of 
proxy marriage is long overdue. 
I. THE VALIDITY OF PROXY MARRIAGE: THEN AND NOW 
The history of proxy marriage is as long as it is sordid. 
Indeed, some scholars trace the origin of proxy marriage to biblical 
times.33 It was a well-accepted means of perfecting a marriage in 
antiquity under both of the world’s great legal traditions—civil law 
and common law; it remained possible through the Middle Ages;34 and 
it likely even took hold in the American colonies.35 In fact, proxy 
marriage was practiced somewhat prolifically in the United States 
until just after World War I, when racial and immigration concerns 
led to its virtual demise.36 Today, the possibility of a valid proxy 
marriage in America is rather scant. Much of the rest of the world 
holds quite a different view, however, making the legality of proxy 
  
 30 See infra Part II.C. Pennsylvania was the first state to enact a special 
durable power of attorney for health care decisions in 1983. Cynthia M. Garraty, 
Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care: A Better Choice, 7 CONN. PROB. L.J. 115, 
119 (1992) (citing 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5607 (Purdon Supp. 1991)). By 
1992, thirty-two states had done so. Id. at 120. 
 31 See infra Part II.A. 
 32 See infra Part II.B. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:951-:954 (2008).  
 33 See, e.g., Luke B. Henry, California and Proxy Marriage, 27 J. ST. B. CAL. 
294, 294 (1952) (“The first recorded instance of a marriage contracted by proxy is said 
to have been when Rebecca offered water from the well to the servant of Abraham who 
had been empowered to find a wife for Abraham’s son, Isaac.”). 
 34 See infra Part I.A.2.  
 35 See infra Part I.A.4.  
 36 See infra Part I.A.5.  
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marriage a controversial issue over which nations regularly engage in 
vigorous debate.37 
A. The Genesis and Development of the Proxy-Marriage Doctrine  
The validity of a proxy marriage was recognized at some point 
across almost all societies. Even those groups most expected to abhor 
the doctrine—in particular, organized religious groups, such as the 
Roman Catholic Church—embraced proxy marriage as necessary and 
equitable.38 As a result, proxy marriage rather easily gained 
acceptance in the United States.39 After its introduction, however, the 
doctrine quickly became loathed and was ultimately abrogated.40 
1. Roman Acceptance of Marriage by Messenger 
For the ancient Romans, marriage was viewed as a contract—
a relationship “based solely upon the agreement of the parties to take 
each other from that moment as husband and wife.”41 Thus, in Roman 
times, the only precondition for a valid marriage was mutually 
expressed consent.42 No particular ceremony or officiant was required, 
and the consent of the spouses was not required to take any 
particular form.43 As in all contracts, expressions of consent could be 
made in writing, orally, and sometimes even tacitly.44  
This perception of marriage as a mere civil contract was 
taken quite seriously, so much so that Roman authorities viewed the 
expression of consent (at least for a man) as possible not only in 
person but also through a letter or the use of an agent, both of which 
were acceptable means of consenting to ordinary contractual 
relationships.45 Thus, Roman law permitted a man away from home to 
  
 37 See Egon Schwelb, Marriage and Human Rights, 12 AM. J. COMP. L. 337, 
365-69 (1963).  
 38 See infra Part I.A.2. 
 39  See infra Part I.A.4. 
 40 See infra Part I.A.5. 
 41 Ernest G. Lorenzen, Marriage by Proxy and the Conflict of Laws, 32 HARV. 
L. REV. 473, 474 (1919). 
 42 FRITZ SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 111 (1951). This has been true, at 
least, since the time of Alexander the Great. See Charles Donahue, Jr., The Case of the 
Man Who Fell into the Tiber: The Roman Law of Marriage at the Time of the 
Glossators, 22 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 11-12 (1978). In more ancient times, the consent of 
the bride was altogether unnecessary, though Roman law evolved to require the 
consent of both the bride and groom. A.A. Roberts, Marriage by Proxy: Including a 
Brief Consideration of the Nature of Marriage and of Agency, 60 SALJ 280, 284 (1943). 
Additionally, a paterfamilias’ consent to the marriage of a child under his power was 
required. Susan Treggiari, Ideals and Practicalities in Matchmaking in Ancient Rome, 
in THE FAMILY IN ITALY FROM ANTIQUITY TO PRESENT 94 (David I. Kertzer & Richard P. 
Saller eds., 1991).  
 43 Treggiari, supra note 42, at 95-96. 
 44 Id. at 96. 
 45 Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 474. 
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perfect a marriage in his absence through the use of a messenger.46 
The intended husband’s use of a proxy in this manner created a 
perfectly valid marriage.47 The option to marry by proxy, however, did 
not extend to an absent woman, largely due to Roman views of the 
appropriate course of conduct between parties immediately after the 
marriage ceremony.48 The notion was that wife needed to be led into 
the domicile of the marriage such that the parties could officially 
begin their married life, and in early Roman times, the marital 
domicile was necessarily that of the husband.49 It was therefore 
impossible for a Roman wife to use a proxy to perfect the marital 
contract because she could not then be led to the marital domicile. 
The Roman husband, however, was free to marry by proxy at will.50 
By roughly 550 AD, the requirement that the wife be led to the home 
of the husband was no longer a clear legal mandate, though it 
persisted as a custom for some time.51 Thus, by the middle of the sixth 
century, proxy marriage had fully taken hold as a legally permissible 
manner of creating the marital relationship.52  
This rather complete acceptance of proxy marriage by Roman 
citizens and jurists would prove significant. The spread of Roman law 
throughout nearly all of Europe53 and its role in shaping the civil law 
of a number of European countries more than six centuries later54 
ensured proxy marriage a continuing presence in the international 
legal landscape.55 
2. Canon Law’s Surprising Approval 
Perhaps even more significant to the long-term survival of the 
proxy-marriage doctrine than its Roman law reception is the warm 
welcome it received in Roman Catholic canon law. One might assume 
that marriage was always inextricably linked with religion, but the 
link did not actually appear in law until approximately 541 AD. The 
Corpus Juris Civilis, the Emperor Justinian’s influential compilation 
of early Roman law,56 required that all but citizens holding high office 
“betake themselves to some place of worship and declare their 
intention” to a church official before several witnesses such that the 
  
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Roberts, supra note 42, at 284. 
 49 Id. 
 50 DIG. 23.2.5 (Pomponius, Sabinus 4); Roberts, supra note 42, at 284.  
 51 See sources cited supra note 50.  
 52 Roberts, supra note 42, at 284. 
 53 See PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 39-41 (1999). 
 54 See id. at 43-49.  
 55 See infra Part I.B.2. 
 56 Eric Gillman, Note, Legal Transplants & Investment Agreements: Understanding 
the Exportation of U.S. Law to Latin America, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 263, 263 (2009). 
462 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:2 
 
church could document the marriage.57 Canon law certainly 
recognized marriage as a legal relationship—a contract.58 But in 
requiring that the parties celebrate the perfection of their contract in 
the church and with the blessing of a priest, canon law sought 
primarily to provide the marriage publicity (i.e., to “bring the fact of 
marriage to the notice of the church”).59 Ensuring that the marriage 
was entirely voluntary—that the parties did truly consent to the 
creation of the contract—might best be described as an afterthought, 
a positive side effect of the requirement that marriages take place in 
a church.60 On the background of this aim to bring couples into the 
church to celebrate their marriage contracts, canon law was required 
to take a legal stance on proxy marriage—in essence, to determine 
whether one spouse’s failure to personally declare consent before 
witnesses and a priest was sufficient to taint the entire marriage with 
nullity. Rather surprisingly, the canon law view was that it was not.61 
Centuries later, in 1215, proxy marriage aroused great 
attention at canon law when the Roman Catholic Church, under Pope 
Innocent III’s leadership, fully endorsed the Roman view of the 
validity of a marriage perfected with one party using a stand-in.62 In a 
development somewhat progressive for the time, however, canon law 
modified the Roman rule, making it possible for either husband or 
wife to marry by proxy.63 Thus, the possibility of proxy marriage 
became rather well accepted—and gender-neutral—in the canon law 
of the early thirteenth century.64  
More than one hundred years later, under Pope Boniface VIII, 
the church’s approval of proxy marriage persisted,65 though not 
without some dissatisfaction. A number of church officials voiced 
opposition to the continuing acceptance of proxy marriage, suggesting 
that the marital contract is one “of such far reaching consequences 
that [consent] should be expressed in person instead of by proxy.”66 
Even in the face of this opposition, however, the church continued to 
  
 57 Roberts, supra note 42, at 285-86. 
 58 Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 475. 
 59 Id. at 476.  
 60 By the time of the Council of Trent in 1563, issues relating to the 
voluntariness of consent to the marital relationship had gained more sway. CARRIÈRE, 
DE MATRIMONIO § 4; EMIL FRIEDBERG, LEHRBUCH DES KATHOLISCHEN UND 
EVANGELISCHEN KIRCHENRECHTS 490 (1895); see also Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 476 
(“Since the Council of Trent (1563) matrimonial consents must be exchanged according 
to the Canon Law before a priest and at least two witnesses.”).  
 61 Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 473 (“That marriage by proxy was allowed in 
the . . . Canon Law is an established fact.”). 
 62 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 370-71 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1898); see also 
Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 475. 
 63 Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 475. 
 64 Id. at 474. 
 65 Id. at 475. 
 66 Id. 
2011] REVIVING PROXY MARRIAGE 463 
 
treat proxy marriages as valid.67 The majority view was that there is 
an in-person expression of consent by a principal to a proxy 
marriage.68 Agency theory views the agent as a “stand-in” for the 
principal, such that when an agent expresses his assent to a contract, 
the principal has essentially “pronounce[d] the words” himself 
“through the [agent’s] mouth.”69 
By the time of the Roman Catholic Church’s most important 
ecumenical council, the Council of Trent in 1563, the church’s internal 
debate over the permissibility of proxy marriage had reached a fever 
pitch again. Disagreement centered upon whether the appointment of a 
proxy was to be done in the same form as the expression of consent in 
the marriage ceremony itself—namely before a priest and at least two 
witnesses.70 Focusing on the core intent of canon law’s ceremonial 
requirement (again, to publicize the marriage to the church), the 
prevailing view was that ceremonial requirements need not extend to 
the contract created between an intended spouse and the proxy he 
appointed to act on his behalf, as the form of this agency contract did 
not bear in any way on the church’s knowledge of the marriage.71 Thus, 
at the termination of Council of Trent in the late sixteenth century, 
proxy marriage was still very much a part of canon law. 
3. English Common Law Reception 
The early English common law of marriage, much like Roman 
law, focused virtually all of its marriage requirements on ensuring 
the voluntary consent of both spouses. And thus, a solemn 
ceremony—in which the husband pledged to love, comfort, honor, and 
keep his wife in sickness and health, and to remain faithful to her, 
and in which the wife vowed to do the same, and also to obey and 
serve her husband—was a critical part of any English marriage 
ceremony.72 Such declarations were intended to assure that the 
contracting parties “seriously weigh and consider” married life and 
express consent only after fully analyzing the rights and duties the 
relationship would bring.73  
The English ceremonial requirements necessarily raised the 
question of whether marriages contracted with the parties outside 
each other’s physical presence—and thus unable to make the 
necessary declarations in person—could have validity. The English 
answer to this question was clear. The Church of England wholly 
  
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 476. 
 71 Id.  
 72 WILLIAM TEGG, THE KNOT TIED: MARRIAGE CEREMONIES OF ALL NATIONS 
19-20 (1877). 
 73 Id. at 20. 
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adopted the canon law view of proxy marriage.74 Marriages between 
absent persons could be validly contracted by letter, by messenger, or 
through the use of agents.75 The only exception at English law, which 
was apparently not a requirement of either the Roman or canon law 
systems, was that parties to a proxy marriage “have some notice or 
intelligence” of the other party to the marital relationship, “for unto 
those who be utterly unknown to us, we cannot yield our Consent no 
. . . more than it is possible for us to love them, of whom we have 
never heard.”76 
With that one narrow exception, proxy marriage was as well 
accepted in England through the eighteenth century as it was in the 
rest of the world.77 Indeed, proxy marriage has a place among some of 
the most famous in English history. Queen Mary of England married 
Philip II of Spain in a proxy ceremony in 1554, with a Count Egmont 
standing in for the groom.78 Likewise, King James I of England 
married Anne of Denmark in August of 1589 by proxy.79 After the 
proxy ceremony, Anne set sail to Scotland but was forced by storm to 
the coast of Norway; in what has been described as the “one romantic 
episode of his life,” the king sailed with three hundred men to meet 
his new bride.80 And proxy marriage in old England was neither 
restricted to, nor practiced solely among, the nobility. Ordinary 
citizens separated by substantial distances were known to perfect 
marital relationships from afar as well.81 
4. Proxy Marriage’s Postcolonization Survival? 
When the British migrated to America in the seventeenth 
century, they were said to carry their law with them, which still 
legitimized proxy marriage.82 The new American colonies essentially 
adopted English law after their colonization.83 It is virtually universally 
  
 74 Id. at 21-22; see also Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 480-81. 
 75 Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 481 (quoting SWINBURNE, ESPOUSALS 162 (2d 
ed. 1711)).  
 76 Id.  
 77 See id. at 482. The first recorded evidence of proxy marriage in England is 
in Lyndwood’s Provinciale, written in 1430. Id. at 480. 
 78 1 WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE 
SECOND, KING OF SPAIN 90-91 (1882); TEGG, supra note 72, at 184. 
 79 Hugh Chisholm, Anne of Denmark, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 69-70 (11th 
ed. 1910). 
 80 DAVID HARRIS WILLSON, KING JAMES VI AND I 85 (1956). 
 81 See generally SWINBURNE, supra note 75, at 162 (“Betwixt them that be 
absent, Spousals or Matrimony may be contracted three manner of ways; that is to say, 
by Mediation of their Proctors, or of Messengers, or of Letters; provided nevertheless in 
every of those Cases, that the Parties have some notice or intelligence the one of the 
other, at hand by Fame or Report . . . .”). 
 82 Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 482. 
 83 Id.  
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accepted, however, that the new colonies adopted English law only to 
the extent that it was suited to their unique colonial conditions.84  
While there is no hard and fast evidence that colonial 
American law sanctioned proxy marriage, colonial embracement of 
British law strongly suggests that proxy marriage was permitted in 
early America. “That [marital] consent might be expressed by an agent 
was admitted by the Roman law, by the Canon law, and . . . by the 
English law as late as the eighteenth century.”85 The only remaining 
question is whether colonists might have rejected the British law 
sanctioning proxy marriage as unsuited to the times.86 That is highly 
unlikely. Proxy marriage was likely even more closely tailored to 
American colonial society than it was to its British counterpart: “Many 
a colonist must have left his sweetheart behind when he first ventured 
over seas. [Still others] must have desired, after becoming established 
in this country, to marry someone whom they had known in their 
native land.”87 In either situation, a trip to the homeland merely for the 
purpose of perfecting a marriage was as time consuming as it was cost 
prohibitive.88 Proxy marriage was precisely the legal device to solve the 
problem created by the distance gap. It “would enable the woman to 
become the man’s wife before leaving her home” country on a long and 
arduous journey to the colonies.89 
As a result, though there is very little evidence in colonial law 
of a wholesale acceptance of proxy marriage,90 its suitability for 
colonial times, and the fact that American states in the decades 
following colonization seemed to recognize the possibility of a proxy 
marriage, make it a near certainty that proxy marriage did migrate 
to the new world along with its British settlers. 
5. The Twentieth Century: Marriage, War, Prostitutes, and 
“Picture Brides” Intertwined 
If proxy marriage was legally sanctioned in colonial America, 
it went virtually unrecognized for decades. But around the turn of the 
twentieth century, and for the following forty years, proxy marriage 
garnered substantial new interest.91 The reason for the renewed 
attention paid to the old, perhaps even dying, doctrine was clear. Two 
  
 84 See id.  
 85 Id.  
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. (“Marriages by proxy have doubtless taken place in this country, but no 
record thereof can be found in the decisions of the courts.”). 
 91 Lillian M. Gordon, Marriage by Proxy: The Need for Certainty and Equality 
in the Laws of the American States, 20 SOC. SERV. REV. 29, 32 (1946). 
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world wars raised new social problems to which the traditional 
conception of ceremonial marriage provided no just solution.  
Servicemen stationed overseas strongly desired the ability to 
use proxy marriage to make formal unions for which they were unable 
to express consent in the physical presence of their intended wives. 
World War I, “when only four million men were in the armed forces, 
occasioned a demand whose dimensions impelled the Judge Advocate 
General of the Army to provide a model form of contract for marriage 
by mail.”92 And by the time of World War II, “when over eleven million 
persons were in the armed forces, the need for a valid form of marriage 
between absent parties assumed even greater proportions.”93 Because 
family law at the time branded children born outside of wedlock as 
illegitimates not entitled to the same legal rights and protections as 
children born of a marriage,94 there was more at stake than these 
servicemen’s sense of pride and emotion. “[C]hildren fathered by 
servicemen before embarkation” deserved a means of legal protection 
that ceremonial marriage could not provide.95  
As a result, many members of the armed forces in both world 
wars engaged in proxy marriages, despite the lack of clarity as to 
whether such marriages carried the force of law in early twentieth-
century America.96 Some scholars of the time argued that these 
marriages were no doubt legally valid.97 Others argued that 
clarification was needed on the validity of a marriage ceremony 
conducted with the use of an agent.98 A few state legislatures responded 
with narrowly-tailored bills that recognized the validity of proxy 
marriages between absent servicemen and their partners.99 Still other 
states decried the practice of proxy marriage altogether, begrudging its 
perceived disastrous impact on American immigration policy.100  
Regardless of the generally prevailing view of the propriety 
and necessity of proxy marriages for military personnel, a growing 
fear and loathing of the practical effect of a broad approval of proxy 
marriage reached new heights in the 1920s. This concern was largely 
fueled by immigration policy, racism, and a staunchly-held American 
  
 92 Id.  
 93 Id.  
 94 See Christopher C. Brown, Illegitimacy and Veterans’ Benefits Legislation, 
21 HOW. L.J. 421, 421-22 (1978). 
 95 The Validity of Absentee Marriage of Servicemen, 55 YALE L.J. 735, 736 (1946). 
 96 Id. at 735. 
 97 See Comments, 25 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 181 (1952) (“The validity of a proxy 
marriage may be sustained on either or both of two basic theories. The first and more 
common theory upholds the proxy marriage as being a valid common law marriage . . . . The 
more recent and intricate approach sustains the act as being a valid ceremonial marriage 
which fully complies with the technicalities of the jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)). 
 98 The Validity of Absentee Marriage of Servicemen, supra note 95, at 736-37. 
 99 Gordon, supra note 91, at 33 (describing New Jersey and Georgia bills to 
permit proxy marriage for servicemen on duty). 
 100 Id. 
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view of love-based marriage that was not widely accepted in many 
other cultures at the time.101 
The crux of the growing distaste for proxy marriage stemmed 
from a gate-keeping problem. If American soldiers stationed overseas 
were permitted to marry their brides from a distance, then the law 
effectively recognized absentee marriages conducted by proxy. And 
once the law admitted the possibility of valid absentee marriages, it 
was confronted with the possibility that the absent spouse might not 
be an American citizen serviceman stationed abroad. Rather, an 
absentee marriage with the assistance of a proxy might be conducted 
between an American citizen, present in person for the marriage 
ceremony, and his bride located abroad. And while the base legal 
transaction was the same—one American citizen in the United States 
marrying another not present in the United States for the 
ceremony—perception of the two situations differed immensely. Men 
who wished to marry foreign brides by proxy were dubbed scoundrels, 
pimps, or worse.102 
The core of the problem was that immigration rules provided 
for easy, automatic, and permanent resident status in the United 
States for the spouse of any American citizen.103 When American men 
began to use proxy marriage to choose foreign brides who eventually 
emigrated to the United States, concerns arose along two fronts. 
First, the Bureau of Immigration104 became worried that the doctrine 
of proxy marriage was being abused as a means of bringing foreign 
prostitutes into the United States.105 That concern was racially tinged. 
Immigration officials at the time “suspected all Jews at entry ports; 
only Asians drew more fire.”106 Immigration agents believed that 
ninety percent of Japanese and Chinese women immigrating to the 
United States at the time were actually brought in as prostitutes.107 
Second, even when it was clear that a proxy marriage did not involve 
the immigration of a prostitute, American officials disdained the 
continuation of proxy marriage and the benefits it conveyed on 
spouses living abroad because they believed it led to the proliferation 
  
 101 COTT, supra note 20, at 148-50. 
 102 See generally id. at 146-48.  
 103 See Amy L. Elson, The Mail Order Bride Industry and Immigration: 
Combating Immigration Fraud, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 367, 368-69 (1997). 
 104 The Bureau of Immigration has undergone numerous name changes in the 
last century. It is now referred to as United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS). Immigration Updates, RENSSELEAR POLYTECHNIC INST., http://www. 
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 105 COTT, supra note 20, at 148-49. 
 106 Id. at 149. 
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of “picture brides” entering America.108 These picture brides—the 
early twentieth-century equivalent of today’s “mail order bride”109—
entered the country after a proxy marriage to an American husband, 
typically without even having met him before landing on American 
soil.110 Asian immigrants were again the suspect class here, with 
particular scrutiny applied to marriages involving Japanese and 
Korean immigrants.111 Throughout much of the twentieth century, 
Asian cultures generally accepted the idea of arranged marriage,112 
valuing “economic bargaining” and building “kinship networks” 
through marriage.113 Such motives for marriage, however, were 
antithetical to the American culture of the time, which had already 
fully committed to the idea of purely love-based marriage.114 
Regarding picture brides, “the whiff of compulsion of the couple by 
extended family members, the possible instrumentalism of the 
marriage choice, and the importance of monetary considerations all 
ran against the American grain. An arranged marriage represented 
coercion.”115 Thus, proxy marriage began to be viewed as a means of 
skirting societal norms surrounding marriage. 
Though fear was at its peak, it is still unclear precisely how 
much abuse of the proxy-marriage doctrine and its resulting 
immigration benefits actually existed. Newspaper headlines of the 
time “screamed out . . . ‘Japanese Picture Brides Are Swarming 
Here.’”116 But when “[p]ressured by the Japan Association of America, 
the Bureau of Immigration conceded that only 865 proxy brides 
landed in San Francisco during the year from June 1914 to June 
1915. The California population at the time numbered nearly 3 
million.”117 Still, due to concerns over prostitution and the motives of 
those marrying by proxy, in the early 1920s, American officials took 
the substantial step of declaring that “any marriage performed when 
one of the parties was in the United States and the other in a foreign 
country was invalid for immigration purposes.”118 The rule was 
exceptionally broad, as it seemed to disapprove of all proxy marriages 
no matter where perfected, at least so long as they were relied upon 
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to confer immigration status. By 1924, then, the view of proxy 
marriage began to morph, and sentiment disfavoring the doctrine 
became overwhelming, even if confined to the immigration context. 
To be sure, American servicemen stationed abroad continued 
to use proxy marriage to perfect unions with their American brides 
even after 1924 and continuing through both world wars.119 Such 
unions posed no immigration complications. But in view of the 
previous uncertainty over the legality of these marriages, the move 
toward the rejection of proxy marriage as a viable means of perfecting 
a legal union—if only in the immigration context—signaled an 
important shift in American thinking. By the late 1920s, proxy 
marriage was viewed, at best, as a necessity in only the most 
exceptional circumstances, and even then, through skeptical lenses.120 
Although proxy marriage peaked again briefly during World War II, 
it became “dormant” shortly afterwards.121 
B. A Dying Institution?: The Status of Proxy Marriage Today 
Today, proxy marriage enjoys mixed levels of acceptance 
around the globe. In the United States, rather widespread tolerance 
of the doctrine faded quickly after the Second World War.122 During 
peace time, a period in which American society was less mobile,123 the 
doctrine of proxy marriage fell into desuetude. It has not yet been 
completely extinguished from the legal landscape in this country, but 
its recognition is a rarity at best. 
Internationally, the reception of proxy marriage as a valid 
means of creating the spousal relationship has enjoyed far more 
longevity. Greater European acceptance of proxy marriage became 
evident in the early 1960s, when the United Nations Convention on 
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration of 
Marriages declined to require the presence of both parties at a 
marriage ceremony in order to create a marriage that brings about 
“‘the natural and fundamental group-unit of society’: the family.”124 The 
United Nations’ refusal to prohibit proxy marriage was one of the most 
  
 119 See Comments, supra note 97, at 181. 
 120 Id. at 184. 
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controversial family law issues of the Convention, with a number of 
jurisdictions strongly advocating on each side of the issue.125 
Indeed, the United Nations’ debate over proxy marriage 
“made it clearer than the consideration of any other issue to what 
extent . . . the world was still divided on the concept of marriage.”126 
Even forty years after those initial United Nations discussions, 
divisions persist. The American view of the impermissibility of proxy 
marriage is simply not one shared globally.127 
1. Limited American Law Recognition 
These days, the possibility of perfecting a valid proxy 
marriage in the United States has grown remote. Only a handful of 
states approve the practice,128 and most do so on a very limited basis. 
Moreover, even in states that rather liberally sanction the creation of 
a marital relationship by proxy, little reported litigation exists to 
flesh out the details of the law. 
All but one of the five states allowing proxy marriage does so 
expressly by statute. Kansas statutes provide perhaps the least 
clarity on the issue. In its legislation detailing the solemnization 
requirements of a Kansas marriage, proxy marriage is not mentioned 
at all.129 Kansas simply requires a marriage license and a particular 
type of officiant.130 The statute neither sanctions nor prohibits 
marriages conducted by proxy.131 Nonetheless, in response to requests 
for guidance from state district judges, the Kansas Attorney General 
has issued a number of opinions on the validity of proxy marriages in 
the state, and every Attorney General opinion on this issue since the 
first in 1944 is consistent.132 In the absence of an express legislative 
prohibition, proxy marriages are legal in Kansas.133 The requirement 
is simply that the person who will not attend the marriage ceremony 
give a valid power of attorney to the proxy.134 
Texas statutes provide slightly more guidance. Persons 
“unable to appear for [a marriage] ceremony” are authorized to 
  
 125 Id. at 365-66. 
 126 Id. at 365.  
 127 See infra Part I.B.2. 
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 129 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-104a (2010). 
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appoint a proxy by affidavit.135 The statute is broad, insofar as it does 
not limit the availability of proxy marriage to any particular class of 
persons.136 Setting ceremonial requirements aside, Texas even allows 
parties to act by proxy in seeking a marriage license,137 but only if the 
party seeking the license by proxy is “on active duty as a member” of 
the state or federal armed forces or “confined in a correctional 
facility.”138 The Texas Attorney General has opined, in response to a 
district attorney’s question, that the use of a proxy to obtain a 
marriage license in Texas may even permit double proxies.139 
Specifically, the Attorney General expressed that two inmates would 
be permitted to obtain a marriage license while incarcerated, each 
using his own proxy.140  
No Texas authority extends the double proxy rule to 
participation in the marriage ceremony. Nonetheless, Texas law 
rather liberally permits proxy marriage in allowing any person to 
utilize a proxy for the ceremony rather than limiting its use to 
members of the armed forces or those incarcerated.141 The statute 
requires only that the person using the proxy execute an affidavit 
with detailed information about the applicant and an “appointment of 
any adult . . . to act as proxy for the purpose of participating in the 
ceremony.”142 No reported Texas appellate opinion applies the Texas 
statute or discusses the Attorney General opinion, and thus, the 
pragmatic state of Texas law on proxy marriage remains unclear.  
The rules in Colorado and Montana are nearly identical. Both 
states’ statutes provide,  
If a party to a marriage is unable to be present at the solemnization, 
such party may authorize in writing a third party to act as such 
party’s proxy. If the person solemnizing the marriage is satisfied that 
the absent party is unable to be present and has consented to the 
marriage, such person may solemnize the marriage by proxy. If such 
person is not satisfied, the parties may petition the district court for 
an order permitting the marriage to be solemnized by proxy.143  
Thus, both states appear to provide any party a right to marry by 
proxy, for any reason, so long as he has properly appointed an agent.  
  
 135 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.203(b) (West 2006). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. § 2.006(c). 
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 139 Op. Att’y Gen. GA-0024, 2003 WL 396062 (Tex. A.G. 2003). A marriage by 
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However, in April 2007, Montana departed from Colorado law 
when it adopted a more stringent limitation on eligibility to marry by 
proxy. Specifically, Montana limited the use of proxy marriage to military 
personnel.144 Yet, even with this limitation, Montana is notorious for 
having the most liberal proxy-marriage scheme in the country—the only 
state allowing double proxies for the marriage ceremony.145 
Finally, California expressly allows for the perfection of a 
valid proxy marriage.146 California’s proxy marriage statute is both 
more detailed and more stringent than those found in other states.147 
The legislation allows a marriage by agent only for a member of the 
United States armed forces who is “stationed overseas and serving in 
a conflict or a war and is unable to appear” for the marriage 
ceremony.148 Moreover, the party stationed overseas must execute a 
power of attorney in writing, which must be notarized or witnessed by 
two officers of the United States armed forces.149 The California proxy 
does not allow the absent spouse’s agent to merely present himself for 
the first time as a representative at the ceremony. Rather, to procure 
the marriage license, the person appointed must personally appear 
with the nonabsent spouse.150 When the marriage license is obtained, 
the power of attorney is presented to the clerk, and it becomes part of 
the marriage certificate thereafter.151  
Although no reported appellate decision exists applying 
California’s proxy marriage statute, a recent California case suggests 
that state law may sanction proxy marriage even for nonmilitary 
personnel. In People v. Tami, in which defendant Tami was 
prosecuted for “filing a false or forged marriage license in a public 
office,” a California appellate court reversed the defendant’s 
conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence to demonstrate that she 
knowingly filed a false or forged document.152 Interestingly, the 
reversal of Tami’s conviction rests almost entirely on the lack of 
clarity in California law with respect to marriage ceremonies 
  
 144 MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-301(4) (2009) (“One party to a proxy marriage 
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completed outside of the physical presence of both spouses and an 
officiant together in the same room.153 
Tami did not involve the traditional circumstances giving rise 
to proxy marriage (i.e., two parties separated by a great distance, 
likely for employment reasons, with one authorizing a close friend or 
relative to “stand in” as a result of the temporary absence). Quite to 
the contrary, Tami sought to marry a man living nearby.154 
Nonetheless, it was not possible for both Tami and her intended 
spouse to participate in a ceremony before a qualified officiant in the 
same room because her fiancé was incarcerated in the San Quentin 
State Prison.155 
Tami sought a marriage license from the Napa County 
Recorder’s Office and told the clerk that her fiancé was “not 
available” to appear.156 The clerk then gave her an affidavit of 
inability to appear, advising her that she and her fiancé would need 
to sign the appropriate forms and that their officiant would need to 
accompany her to obtain the license.157 Tami signed her fiancé’s name, 
with his authorization, by tracing his signature from other 
documents.158 Tami and her officiant, a Universal Life church 
minister, then went to a house where Tami, the officiant, and several 
witnesses conducted a phone ceremony.159 The intended groom 
participated by telephone from prison.160 Defendant Tami then 
submitted a marriage certificate, bearing the signatures of all the 
necessary parties, for filing with the county recorder.161 When 
California prosecuted Tami for knowingly offering a false or 
fraudulent document to be filed in the public records, Tami responded 
that “a ‘proxy marriage’ performed with one party ‘represented by an 
agent’ or present by telephone rather than ‘physically present at the 
ceremony’ is valid in California.”162 
In reversing Tami’s conviction, the court made no effort to 
distinguish this case from a traditional proxy marriage case or to 
determine whether this was even a case involving proxy marriage at 
all. In one sense, a telephone marriage ceremony may seem very 
different from a traditional marriage by proxy. In a telephone 
marriage, the parties do not truly intend for one of them to be 
represented by an agent. Rather, a party’s phone presence is his 
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participation; no other person need “stand in” for him. On the other 
hand, both a traditional proxy scenario and a telephone ceremony 
raise the same core question: can the California statutory 
requirement that parties declare their consent “in the physical 
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and necessary 
witnesses” be met in any manner other than a personal physical 
presence of all necessary persons in the same room at the same 
time?163 Because that core issue is the same whether the marriage is 
one of a serviceman represented by an agent or a prisoner 
participating by telephone, the court focused its discussion on the 
validity of proxy marriage in California.164  
Unfortunately, the Tami court declined to decide whether 
proxy marriages are legal in California.165 Rather, because the crime 
of which Tami was convicted required a “knowing” violation of the 
law, the court focused on what Tami knew or should have known 
about the validity of a California proxy marriage.166 
The Tami court cited three prior decisions bearing on the 
validity of proxy marriage in California. In one of these decisions, 
Barrons v. United States,167 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit actually applied Nevada law to a California resident.168 
But, in so doing, the Barrons court first found that Nevada law 
sanctioning proxy marriage does not violate any strong public policy 
in California.169 The Ninth Circuit went on to say that proxy 
marriages are really no different from more traditional marriages; 
proxy marriages, the Barrons court noted, do not necessarily present 
any serious questions of consent and are occasionally necessary for 
equitable reasons.170 Twelve years later, in Bustamante v. Haet,171 a 
California appellate court cited Barrons and seemed to approve of 
California proxy marriages in a legal malpractice case.172 Finally, 
another California appellate court decision, In re Marriage of 
Dajani,173 assumed the validity of a Jordanian proxy marriage in 
deciding whether to enforce a dowry contract.174 Viewing these three 
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cases together, the Tami court described California law on the 
validity of proxy marriage as “unsettled.”175 The court went on to hold 
that defendant Tami’s conviction could not be upheld because there 
was insufficient proof that she knew her telephone marriage was 
invalid, particularly in light of the “public policy objective to promote 
and protect the marriage relationship.”176 
The Tami court’s reliance on at least two of three precedents to 
suggest that proxy marriage is generally acceptable in California is 
noticeably flawed. That California would recognize the legality of a 
proxy marriage perfected in Nevada or Jordan does not mean that such 
a marriage is legally sanctioned by California law. It is common under 
principles of full faith and credit, and comity for one state to give effect 
to a marriage validly perfected in another jurisdiction.177 Nonetheless, 
the court’s reluctance to state that proxy marriage is not generally 
permitted in California and its description of the law as “unsettled” 
certainly suggest that California courts may be more receptive to 
arguments urging the validity of proxy marriage outside the military 
context than the plain language of California’s statute implies.178 
The cases demonstrate that California law with regard to 
proxy marriage is clear on at least one front: marriage by proxy is 
expressly and clearly sanctioned by statute for certain members of 
the armed services. For ordinary citizens, Tami signals that state law 
on proxy marriage may be in flux.  
Even beyond the five states that expressly allow it, however, 
proxy marriage has significant legal effects. In states that require both 
spouses to be physically present at the marriage ceremony and do not 
allow spouses to use agents to perfect a ceremonial marriage,179 proxy 
marriages are almost always recognized and given legal effect if they 
are perfected in a state that permits them.180 As a result, the impact of 
the legality of proxy marriage is felt throughout the United States. 
  
Manchandia, Practical Steps Towards Eliminating Dowry and Bride-Burning in India, 
13 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 305, 311-12 (2005).  
 175 Tami, 2003 WL 22235337, at *5.  
 176 Id.  
 177 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also Marriage by Proxy—Conflict of Laws, 2 N.Y. 
L. REV. 343, 343 (1924) (“It is general rule that the validity of a marriage, insofar as it 
depends upon the manner or form of its celebration, is governed by the lex loci 
celebrationis. Hence, a marriage solemnized according to the law of the jurisdiction where 
it takes place will generally be regarded as valid everywhere.” (citation omitted)).  
 178 See Tami, 2003 WL 22235337, at *5.  
 179 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-125 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-109 
(2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.070 (West 2005). 
 180 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-112; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 26.04.020; Gibson v. Gibson, 39 N.W. 450, 466 (Neb. 1888); Hardin v. Davis, No. 
A90955, 1945 WL 5519, at *3 (Ohio Ct. C.P. May 18, 1945); State v. Bragg, 163 S.E.2d 
685, 687-88 (W. Va. 1968).  
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2. More Fulsome Recognition Abroad 
Outside of the United States, proxy marriage is far better 
recognized, particularly in Central and South American countries. 
Brazil,181 Argentina,182 Colombia,183 Bolivia,184 Peru,185 Uruguay,186 
Venezuela,187 Ecuador,188 Panama,189 El Salvador,190 Costa Rica,191 
Mexico,192 and Cuba193 all permit a party to fulfill the requirements of 
a ceremonial marriage through the use of an agent.194 It is perhaps 
not so surprising that these countries share in the acceptance of 
  
 181 CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 201 (Braz.), translated in CIVIL CODE OF BRAZIL 53-54 
(Joseph Wheless trans., 1920) (“The marriage may be celebrated by power of attorney 
containing special powers to the mandatary to receive, in the name of the grantor, the 
other party.”).  
 182 CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 173 (Arg.), translated in CIVIL CODE OF ARGENTINA 37 
(Julio Romañach, Jr., trans., 2008) (“Marriage at a distance is one in which the absentee 
party expresses his consent before the competent authority to officiate at marriage 
ceremonies at the place where he is. The documentation verifying the absentee’s consent 
can only be offered within ninety days of the date when it was granted.”). 
 183 CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 114 (Colom.). 
 184 CÓDIGO DE FAMILIA art. 55 (Bol.). 
 185 CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 264 (Peru). 
 186 CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 100 (Uru.). 
 187 CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 67 (Venez.). 
 188 CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 101 (Ecuador). 
 189 CÓDIGO DE LA FAMILIA art. 47 (Pan.), translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF 
PANAMA 294-95 (Julio Romañach, Jr., trans., 2009) (“Marriage can be contracted by the 
appearance before the official and two witnesses, without legal impediment, by one of 
the parties and the person to whom the other party has awarded a special power of 
attorney, by notarial act; provided that the person that is domiciled or is a resident at 
the place of officiating of the official that is to celebrate the marriage is always 
necessary. The power of attorney must express the name of the person with whom the 
marriage is to be performed, and basic informational facts for identifying the person, 
and the marriage shall be valid unless the revocation of the power of attorney has been 
given to the empowered agent, in due form, prior to the celebration of the marriage.”).  
 190 CÓDIGO DE FAMILIA art. 30 (El Sal.). 
 191 CÓDIGO DE FAMILIA art. 30 (Costa Rica). 
 192 CÓDIGO CIVIL FEDERAL art. 102 (Mex.), translated in FEDERAL CIVIL CODE 
OF MEXICO 17 (Julio Romañach, Jr., trans., 2003) (“The parties or their specially 
empowered agents, constituted in the manner provided in Article 44, as well as two 
witnesses to each of the parties that verify their identity, must be present before the 
Civil Registry judge at the place, day and hour designated for the celebration of the 
marriage.”); id. art. 44 (“When the interested parties cannot personally appear, they 
can be represented by a mandatary (agent) specially empowered for the act, whose 
appointment must be made at least by private writing made before two witnesses. In 
cases involving marriage . . . a power of attorney given by notarial act or mandate 
(agency) given by private writing signed by the principal and two witnesses, the 
signatures being ratified before a notary public, a family court judge, a juvenile court 
judge, or a justice of the peace is required.”). 
 193 CÓDIGO DE LA FAMILIA art. 10 (Cuba).  
 194 See, e.g., CÓDIGO DE LA FAMILIA art. 47 (Pan.), translated in THE CIVIL 
CODE OF PANAMA, supra note 189, at 294-95 (“Marriage can be contracted by the 
appearance before the official and two witnesses, without legal impediment, by one of 
the parties and the person to whom the other party has awarded a special power of 
attorney, by notarial act . . . .”).  
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proxy marriage, as they are all civilian jurisdictions with legal 
systems derived from Roman law,195 which always permitted 
marriages by proxy.196 These countries simply carried forward the 
Roman law allowing the use of agents in perfecting a marital 
contract.197 Much of Europe still permits marriages perfected by proxy 
as well, and likely for the same historical reasons. The doctrine still 
exists in France,198 Spain,199 Italy,200 and Poland.201 Finally, virtually all 
of the countries governed by Islamic law sanction proxy marriage202 
and do so very broadly, allowing double proxies203 and often giving the 
proxy “unlimited discretion” to enter into marriage contracts, 
including the power to choose a mate on behalf of the principal.204 
Overall, the global community is far more liberal in permitting 
the application of agency principles to the marital relationship.205 And 
this widespread acceptance of proxy marriage is significant because it 
bleeds into America. Even if we refuse to recognize proxy marriages 
celebrated within American borders, we do give effect to such 
marriages validly perfected abroad.206 Thus, the general legal attitude 
  
 195 Hans Kirchberger, The Significance of Roman Law for the Americas and 
Its Importance to Inter-American Relations, 1944 WIS. L. REV. 249, 255.  
 196 See supra Part I.A.1. 
 197 See supra Part I.A.1. 
 198 CODE CIVIL art. 96-1 (Fr.) (only for “servicemen, sailors of the State, or persons 
employed to follow the armies or on board State vessels” (author’s translation)). 
 199 CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 87 (Spain), translated in CLIFFORD STEVENS WILSON, 
THE CIVIL LAW IN SPAIN AND SPANISH-AMERICA 141 (1900) (“Marriages shall be 
celebrated personally or by a proxy to whom a special power has been granted; but the 
presence of the contracting party who is domiciled or resides in the district of the Judge 
who is to authorize the marriage shall always be necessary. The name of the person 
with whom the marriage is to be celebrated shall be expressed in the special power, 
and such power shall be valid if, before its celebration, the person so authorized should 
not have been notified in an authentic form of the revocation of power.”).  
 200 Only members of the armed forces may marry by proxy under Italian law or 
those in extraordinary circumstances. CODICE CIVILE art. 111 (It.) (“The military and 
persons who by reason of their duties are attached to the armed forces can celebrate 
marriage by proxy in war time. Celebration of marriage by proxy can also take place if 
one of the future spouses resides abroad and serious reasons exist, to be appraised by the 
tribunal in whose jurisdiction the other future spouse resides.” (author’s translation)). 
 201 FAM. CODE art. 6 (Pol.).  
 202 See C.M. SHAFQAT, THE MUSLIM MARRIAGE, DOWER AND DIVORCE 35-36 (1955). 
 203 See Schwelb, supra note 37, at 368. 
 204 Id.  
 205 See id. at 365-68. England, however, ended its long-lasting approval of 
proxy marriages in 1844 with the case of Regina v. Millis in which the English House 
of Lords declared that it has never been the English law that a marriage confected 
without a ceremony was a valid marriage. Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 482 (citing 
Regina v. Mills, (1844) 8 Eng. Rep. 844 (H.L.)); see also 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra 
note 62, at 370.  
 206 See Cosulich Societe Triestina Di Navigazione v. Elting, 66 F.2d 534 (2d 
Cir. 1933) (describing a willingness of many American courts to recognize proxy 
marriages that are valid where they are contracted); Silva v. Tillinghast, 36 F.2d 801 
(Mass. Dist. Ct. 1929); Kane v. Johnson, 13 F.2d 432 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1926); United 
States ex rel. Modianos v. Tuttle, 12 F.2d 927 (E.D. La. 1925); Ex parte Suzanna, 295 F. 
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toward the use of agents to perfect the marriage contract around the 
globe is important in shaping American policy. 
II. AGENCY IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 
Since the start of agency theory’s recognition thousands of 
years ago, the powers permissibly delegated to an agent have been 
exceptionally broad.207 Traditionally, a valid agency relationship could 
be created for any lawful purpose.208 The only remaining question was 
whether the principal himself had the authority to do what he 
appointed an agent to do.209 Indeed, there are generally only two 
exceptions to the theory that an agent can be appointed to do 
anything that the principal himself can do.210 First, agency authority 
may not be created for the performance of an act that is unlawful or 
otherwise violates public policy.211 Second, the nondelegable-acts 
doctrine212 prohibits agency delegation of acts that are exceptionally 
“personal in . . . nature.”213 
Precisely what falls within the nondelegable-acts doctrine has 
been a tricky question for courts and legal scholars. The theory is 
clear enough: acts that rest upon some special skill or personal 
quality of the principal must be performed by the principal alone, and 
their performance may not be delegated to another.214 In practice, 
however, it has been nearly impossible to determine precisely where 
the line between intimate, nondelegable acts and those for which 
agency principles may freely apply should be drawn.215 Still, agency 
scholars have spoken rather confidently for years about a select few 
intimate relationships.216 Because “[i]t is expected that [a] testator 
will exercise his own judgment concerning his relationship [with his 
would-be] donees, their needs, his obligations to them, and the like,” 
proxy will-making has long been considered precisely the type of 
transaction covered under the nondelegable-acts doctrine.217 Creation 
of custodial rights over a child has also been viewed as an intimate 
  
713 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1924); United States ex rel. Aznar v. Comm’r of Immigration, 298 
F. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).  
 207 Mark Fowler, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 985, 1015 (1984). 
 208 MECHEM, supra note 14, § 80. 
 209 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.04 cmt. b (2006). 
 210 Id. § 3.05 cmt. b. 
 211 MECHEM, supra note 14, § 81. 
 212 See Fowler, supra note 207, at 1010 (defining the “nondelegable acts doctrine”). 
 213 See MECHEM, supra note 14, § 81. 
 214 Id. 
 215 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.04 (2006); Fowler, supra note 
207, at 1010 (“The basic policy underlying the nondelegable acts doctrine is that some 
decisions should be made personally—or not made at all.”). 
 216 See MECHEM, supra note 14, § 126. 
 217 Id.; see also Fowler, supra note 207, at 1009.  
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act unsuitable for agency’s application.218 Medical decision-making 
historically was excluded from the domain of agency.219 And, of course, 
taking marriage vows by proxy is not generally tolerated.220  
With the sole exception of marriage, however, in the last 
thirty years, legal thinking on the propriety of agency law’s 
application to each of these intimate relationships has changed 
drastically. While once described as “doubtless” nondelegable acts,221 
proxy will-making,222 contracts to transfer child custody,223 and grants 
of authority to another to make health care decisions224 are now all 
permissible. Only marriage remains an intimate transaction not yet 
reevaluated under the nondelegable-acts doctrine. 
A. Will-Making by Proxy: A “Notably New Development”225 
Much like the contract of marriage, the making of a will 
“holds a unique and revered position in our collective psyche.”226 A will 
is among the most personal and significant legal acts in which a 
person engages.227 Nonetheless, the use of agents in will-making has 
long been recognized as a means of carrying out necessary will 
formalities.228 In the last twenty years, the use of agency principles in 
the will context has increased to such a degree that, for the first time 
in history, an agent may even make dispositions, essentially creating 
an entire will on the testator’s behalf.229 The acceptance of proxy will-
making has progressed slowly and is continuing still, but it signals a 
substantial erosion of the theory that agency principles are 
necessarily inappropriate for application to intimate affairs. 
When considering a person’s ability to legally use a proxy in 
creating a will, the distinction between a “proxy signature” and a true 
“proxy will” must be closely observed. The two have been treated 
  
 218 See MECHEM, supra note 14, § 126 (describing consent to an adoption as an 
act too personal to be done with the use of agency).  
 219 See Fowler, supra note 207, at 1010 (describing scholarly speculation that 
medical decisionmaking was an act too personal to be delegated). 
 220 See MECHEM, supra note 14, § 126. 
 221 Id. 
 222 See infra Part II.A. 
 223 See infra Part II.B. 
 224 See infra Part II.C. 
 225 Ralph C. Brashier, Policy, Perspective, and the Proxy Will, 61 S.C. L. REV. 
63, 105 (2009). 
 226 Id. at 93. 
 227 See In re Estate of Hart, 295 P.2d 985, 1002 (Wyo. 1956) (“It is, and for 
many centuries has been, a common thought in our economic system, that to execute a 
last will and testament is the most solemn and sacred act of a man’s life.”); I.J. 
Hardingham, The Rule Against Delegation of Will-Making Power, 9 MELB. U. L. REV. 
650, 651 (1974) (“It has been argued that the power to make a will, to exclude next of 
kin, is a personal privilege which may be delegated to no other.”).  
 228 See infra text accompanying note 230. 
 229 See infra text accompanying notes 239-64. 
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differently for centuries, with the idea of a proxy signature in a will 
being far more accepted.230 
It is often possible that a testator unable to comply with will-
making form requirements (perhaps because he is physically 
incapable of signing his will) may use an agent to execute a will in 
proper form.231 Typically, state laws require that the infirm testator 
signify that the instrument at issue is, in fact, his testament and then 
direct a proxy to sign his name.232 Even the Uniform Probate Code, 
which clearly prefers a will signed by the testator himself, allows a 
will to be signed instead “by some other individual in the testator’s 
conscious presence and by the testator’s direction.”233  
Such a proxy transaction differs from proxy marriage in one 
significant way. In the wills context, the testator himself is present 
when the agent signs,234 while the very purpose of sanctioning proxy 
marriage is to allow marriages to take place between parties at a 
distance.235 Nonetheless, both situations involve nothing more than the 
legal acceptance of an alternate means of complying with a form 
requirement—in the case of a will, typically the signature of two 
witnesses or acknowledgment before a notary,236 and in a marriage, a 
ceremonial declaration of consent.237 That the law has sanctioned use of 
an agent to comply with will formalities suggests that the formalities a 
party must accomplish to enter into the marriage contract should be 
permissibly accomplished with the aid of an agent as well. 
Even more compelling is the recent shift toward applying 
agency principles to allow a person not only to sign a will on the 
  
 230 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2008). 
 231 See Brashier, supra note 225, at 92. 
 232 See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1578 (2009). 
 233 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502. The Uniform Probate Code has been adopted 
in part by two states, and in its entirety (with some modifications) by the following 
sixteen states: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, and Utah. ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.06.005-.36.390 (2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 14-1101 to -7308 (2005 & Supp. 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-10-101 to -17-
103 (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 655.82, 711.50-.512, 731.005-735.302, 737.101-.627 
(West 2004 & Supp. 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 539-1 to -12, 560:1-101 to 560:8-101 
(2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 15-1-101 to -7-308 (2006 & Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 
18-A §§ 1-101 to 8-401 (1998 & Supp. 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 700.1101-.8102 
(West 1995 & Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.1-101 to 524.8-103 (West 2002 & 
Supp. 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-1-101 to 72-6-311 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-
2201 to -2902 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-1-101 to -7-522 (West 2003); N.D. CENT. 
CODE §§ 30.1-01-01 to -35-01 (1996 & Supp. 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-6-10 to -100, 
62-1-100 to -7-604 (1987 & Supp. 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 29A-1-101 to -8-101 
(2004 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to -8-101 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).  
 234 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502.  
 235 See Moore, supra note 16, at 313 (“[I]t is only during wartime that 
marriage by proxy is of great utility, since only then are a substantial number of lovers 
forcibly separated for protracted periods.”).  
 236 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(3)(B).  
 237 See supra notes 11-12 for ceremonial requirements of marriage.  
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principal’s behalf but to actually decide upon dispositions for the 
principal, essentially creating an entire will for him. Historically, it 
was impossible to create a valid will by proxy. Roman law dating back 
to the sixth century rejected the practice,238 viewing a will made by 
anyone other than the testator as a will that could not be regarded as 
the testator’s will at all.239 Agency theory was well recognized in both 
early Roman and English law;240 it simply was not applied in the wills 
context.241 Will-making was viewed as an “inalienable right” early in 
the law’s development.242 And many centuries later, that view 
generally persists both in the United States and abroad.243  
However, in seven states and under the Uniform Probate 
Code, recent changes allow the conservator of an incapacitated person 
to make a will on the incapacitated’s behalf.244 Though the rule applies 
only in situations involving conservatorship, agency principles are the 
backbone of this legal development.245 A conservator-agent makes a 
  
 238 ROSCOE POUND, READINGS IN ROMAN LAW 26 (1906) (describing the 
impermissibility of proxy wills in the time of Justinian’s Digest). 
 239 See Brashier, supra note 225, at 63 n.2 (describing the testator himself as the 
only person with the ability to design and implement his own plan); cf. MIN SHANG FA 
SHIWU YANJIU: JICHENG JUAN [A STUDY OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW PRACTICE: 
INHERITANCE VOLUME] 103 (Yang Zhenshan ed., 1993) (proxy wills enforced in China as 
formally defective wills that make dispositions to “worthy” family members). 
 240 See Tony Weir, Contracts in Rome and England, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1615, 
1627-28 (1992).  
 241 See POUND, supra note 238, at 26 (describing the impermissibility of proxy 
wills at Roman law); Hardingham, supra note 227, at 652 (“It would seem to be true to 
say that, in England at least, the rule is ‘simply a rule that no settlor and no testator 
may by means of either power or trust delegate to others the selection of beneficiaries 
from a limited but uncertain class’ for uncertainty has been the vice in all cases 
wherein the rule has been applied.”) (citing I.D. Campbell, The Enigma of General 
Powers of Appointment, 7 RES JUDICATAE 244, 252-53 (1955-1957)). 
 242 See Statute of Wills, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1, § 4 (Eng.) (“[E]very person . . . 
shall have full and free liberty, power and authority to give, dispose, will and devise . . . 
at his free will and pleasure . . . .”); In re Runals’ Estate, 328 N.Y.S.2d 966, 976 (Sur. 
Ct. 1972); In re Nagle’s Estate, 317 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974). But see J.C. 
Shepherd, When the Common Law Fails, 9 EST. & TR. J. 117, 129 (1989) (“Over-all, it is 
important to understand that the power to decide on the disposition of your own 
private property is a power delegated by society to individuals as those in the best 
position to make the most reasonable disposition of the property. It is not some sort of 
inalienable right. Indeed, the whole principle of giving testatory power to individuals 
arose during a time when only a small portion of one’s private property could be passed 
on in a discretionary way. The vast majority of one’s estate would normally pass by 
operation of law to one’s heirs, and will-making was often a supplementary activity.”). 
 243 See, e.g., Hardingham, supra note 227, at 652 (comparative discussion of 
the rule against delegation of will-making power in England and Australia).  
 244 CAL. PROB. CODE § 2580(b)(13) (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-
411(1)(g) (West 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:5-411(a)(7) (LexisNexis 2005); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 5-407(d)(7) (West Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 524.5-411(a)(9) (West Supp. 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.078(1)(a) (West 2009); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-420(8) (2004); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411(a)(7), (b) 
(amended 2008). 
 245 See Brashier, supra note 225, at 102-03.  
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will on behalf of his principal when the principal is incapacitated and 
therefore unable to act personally.246 
The idea of a conservator as proxy will-maker is a new one. 
Conservators hold great power to act on behalf of the incapacitated 
persons they protect.247 But even so, a conservator’s power to act on 
behalf of a protected party has historically excluded will-making 
authority.248 It is only in the last twenty years that states have begun 
to accept the conservator’s making of a will for the incapacitated 
party.249 And, as of 2008, the Uniform Probate Code now even 
sanctions the conservator’s power to make, amend, or revoke a will on 
behalf of a protected person.250  
The theory legitimizing such conduct is one of “substituted 
judgment.”251 Proxy wills made by conservators are said to “reflect a 
substituted judgment of what the protected person would want had 
he retained capacity.”252 Moreover, the extension of will-making power 
to a conservator has increasingly been deemed necessary as a matter 
of equity given the breadth of a conservator’s authority.253 
Conservators already have the power to dispose of their protected 
persons’ property in a substantial way by “engag[ing] in inter vivos 
estate planning through will substitutes,”254 and thus, granting will-
making power to conservators does not represent a severe extension 
of the powers they already hold over the property of the protected 
person.255 Perhaps more importantly, allowing a conservator to draft a 
will may be the only way to accomplish what the incapacitated person 
needs or clearly desires—whether that is revoking a disposition, 
changing a beneficiary, or creating a will from scratch to avoid the 
disposition rules of intestate succession.256 “[W]hy should a 
conservator not be able to accomplish directly by will precisely what 
the protected person would have accomplished had she retained 
testamentary capacity?”257 Responding sympathetically to that 
  
 246 Id. at 92. 
 247 Id.  
 248 Id. 
 249 CAL. PROB. CODE § 2580(b)(13); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-411(1)(g); 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:5-411(a)(7); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 5-407(d)(7); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-411(a)(9); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.078(1)(a); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 464-A:26-a (West 2010). 
 250 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411(a)(7) (amended 2008). 
 251 See Brashier, supra note 225, at 87-89.  
 252 Id. at 68. More recently, states have gone beyond the substituted judgment 
doctrine, in the face of much scholarly criticism, and approved wills made by 
conservators if they make reasonable dispositions in the best interest of the protected 
party. Id. at 88-89. 
 253 Id. at 68.  
 254 Id. at 92. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id.  
 257 Id. 
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question, the developing trend in state law is to allow proxy wills by 
conservator, with protections to minimize the risk of abuse.258  
Still, the reality of increasing acceptance for proxy will-making 
by conservators does not equate to widespread acceptance of proxy will-
making in general. Outside the conservatorship context, when a 
testator remains fully capable of making his own will, his ability to 
delegate that power to an agent is less clear. The Uniform Probate 
Code, which expressly sanctions will-making by conservator, is silent 
on the application of agency principles to will-making absent 
conservatorship.259 The Uniform Power of Attorney Act, which provides 
default rules regarding the creation and scope of powers of attorney, 
likewise takes no stance on proxy will-making by agents generally.260  
At least two states have been more explicit. California 
legislation provides that “[a] power of attorney may not authorize an 
attorney-in-fact to make, publish, declare, amend, or revoke the 
principal’s will.”261 In Arkansas, an appellate decision stated in dicta 
that agency principles could not support an agent’s making of a will 
on behalf of the principal, describing “the decision of who, what, 
when, and how one’s property is to be distributed upon death” as a 
personal one that may be made only by the testator himself.262 
Elsewhere, state law remains mute on proxy will-making by agent. 
It may well be that will-making by a nonconservator agent is 
never fully accepted by state law, but the recent extension of will-
making powers to conservators—which would not have been 
sanctioned in any state twenty years ago—certainly signals a change 
in our view of will-making as a task too personal for the application of 
  
 258 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411 (amended 2008). Section 5-411 states that 
“[a]fter notice to interested persons and upon express authorization of the court, a 
conservator may . . . make, amend or revoke the protected person’s will.” Id. § 5-
411(a)(7). Not only must the conservator comply with the state’s formalities for 
executing wills, but  
[t]he court, in exercising or in approving a conservator’s exercise of the 
powers listed in subsection (a), shall consider primarily the decision that the 
protected person would have made . . . [and also] shall consider (1) the 
financial needs of the protected person and the needs of individuals who are 
in fact dependent on the protected person for support and the interest of 
creditors; (2) possible reduction of income, estate, inheritance, or other tax 
liabilities; (3) eligibility for governmental assistance; (4) the protected 
person’s previous pattern of giving or level of support; (5) the existing estate 
plan; (6) the protected person’s life expectancy and the probability that the 
conservatorship will terminate before the protected person’s death; and (7) 
any other factors the court considers relevant.  
Id. § 5-411(c). 
 259 Brashier, supra note 225, at 101-02. 
 260 UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT §§ 104, 114 (2006).  
 261 CAL. PROB. CODE § 4265 (West 2009); see also Brashier, supra note 225, at 
101-02. Louisiana law provides similarly. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1571 (2010) 
(prohibiting testaments “executed by a mandatary for the testator”). 
 262 In re Estate of Garrett, 100 S.W.3d 72, 76 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003); see also 
Brashier, supra note 225, at 102. 
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agency principles. At least where the equities shift in favor of 
allowing someone other than the testator to make his will because the 
testator can no longer do so himself, concerns over the intimate 
nature of will-making have been shoved aside. One scholar has 
persuasively argued that the evolution of the law on will-making by 
conservators does, and indeed should, begin to compel movement in 
state law toward accepting wills made through agents more 
generally.263 As someone “personally selected by the protected person 
and presumably . . . in the best position to know what the protected 
person would desire,” an agent is even better suited to make a will on 
his principal’s behalf than is a conservator.264 With protections for the 
testator—perhaps including a requirement that authority to make a 
will be given expressly—even proxy will-making by agent may garner 
more widespread approval. 
And even if proxy will-making by agent is never fully 
accepted, the “notably new development” of affording conservators the 
power to make wills on behalf of the parties they protect has 
significant implications in the marital context.265 The penetration of 
agency rules into will-making, even by conservator, more heavily 
intrudes into a personal province than does the creation of a marriage 
by proxy. A conservator or agent making a will for the person he 
represents makes exceptionally detailed and intimate decisions, 
necessarily identifying objects of bounty for the testator and selecting 
the terms of his dispositions.266 By contrast, an agent in a proxy 
marriage merely carries out the necessary formalities of a contract, 
the details of which the principal has already expressed his approval. 
In contrast to the proxy will-maker, then, there is no real discretion 
to be exercised by an agent in the marriage context. The law’s 
recognition of the need to allow will-making by proxy highlights the 
logic of also recognizing marriages by proxy, particularly because the 
manner in which an agent is used in proxy marriage and his function 
in that context is comparatively minor and ministerial. 
B. Delegating a Child’s Care, Custody, and Control 
The relationship between parent and child is viewed as one of 
the most sacred under the law. The law serves to protect that bond in 
myriad ways,267 and interference with parental decision-making for 
children must tread lightly or risk trampling a parent’s Troxel-
  
 263 Brashier, supra note 225, at 102. 
 264 Id. at 101. Brashier deftly discusses potential problems raised by the 
distinction between conservator and agent will-making and provides a rationale for 
extending will-making powers to both groups. Id. at 101-04. 
 265 Id. at 105. 
 266 See id. at 92-93. 
 267 See Michael D. Moberly, Children Should Be Seen and Not Heard: 
Advocating the Recognition of a Parent-Child Privilege in Arizona, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
515, 538 (2003). 
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recognized constitutional rights.268 The mere existence of a biological 
link between parents and children creates not only parental rights, 
but also substantial responsibilities. Parents are required to support 
their children, to provide for their care—even to educate them269 and 
to foster their well-being.270 These duties generally cannot be 
abdicated,271 and the government takes Herculean steps to ensure 
that parents respect the relationship by fulfilling their legal 
responsibilities toward their children.272 The parent-child relationship, 
then, is most certainly a heavily protected one, regulated in large part 
because of its highly intimate nature.273 The law of contract would 
seem to have little application in this intimate context. But even here, 
agency principles permeate the relationship in a significant way. 
Most notably, agency doctrine encroaches upon the very 
personal parent-child relationship in the custody context. In every 
state, custody is viewed through the lens of the best interest of the 
child.274 Natural parents generally exercise custody unless a court 
  
 268 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69-70 (2000) (although court-ordered 
visitation may be the only way to protect a child from severe psychological harm in 
circumstances where a child has enjoyed a substantial relationship with a non-parent, 
a Washington statute authorizing court-ordered visitation was unconstitutional 
because it allowed courts to order visitation on a mere “best interests” standard, i.e., 
without necessary regard to the wishes of the parents). For a discussion of Troxel, see 
David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1135-37 (2001). 
 269 See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 227 (2009) (“Fathers and mothers, by the 
very act of marrying, contract together the obligation of supporting, maintaining, and 
educating their children.”). 
 270 See Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the 
Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 337, 340 (2002) (“[A]dherents of modernity in the domestic 
arena also generally value traditional goals—affectionate, committed families, raising 
secure, happy children.”). 
 271 See, e.g., In re Gates’ Adoption, 85 N.E.2d 597 (Ohio App. 1948); In re 
Wilcox Adoption, 349 P.2d 862 (Or. 1960); Whitton v. Scott, 144 A.2d 706 (Vt. 1958). 
 272 See LeAnn Larson LaFave, Origins and Evolution of the Best Interests of 
the Child Standard, 34 S.D. L. REV. 459, 486-88 (1989) (arguing that despite the law’s 
rule that custody determinations are based on the “best interests of the child,” both 
statutes and jurisprudence encourage parents in a custody battle to show who is the 
better parent and not necessarily the best interests of the child). 
 273 See Moberly, supra note 267, at 538. 
 274 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1998); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (2007); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403 (2007 & Supp. 2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (West 
2009); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 1986 & Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-
10-124 (West 2007 & Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56 (West 2004 & Supp. 
2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 728 (2006 & Supp. 2010); D.C. CODE § 16-914 (2001); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West 1997 & Supp. 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3 (West 2003 
& Supp. 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46 (2005 & Supp. 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-
717 (2006 & Supp. 2008); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-13 (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West 2001 & 
Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (West 
2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335 (2008); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-105 (1994); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West 1998 & Supp. 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 722.27 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West 2002 & 
Supp. 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (West 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375 (West 
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finds that such an arrangement is not in the child’s best interest.275 
And when a nonparent is embroiled in a custody dispute with a 
parent, a court not only considers the child’s best interest, but also 
must typically make a finding that custody in a parent would result 
in substantial harm to the child before awarding custody to a 
nonparent.276 The heightened standard is, again, a function of the 
notion that the parent-child relationship is an important one that 
must suffer minimal intrusion.277 The court serves as gatekeeper of 
the intimate relationship between parent and child. Even so, in the 
last fifteen years, the law has begun to rather freely recognize the 
right of a parent to utilize agency principles to confer custody of a 
minor child, albeit temporarily, to an agent. 
Agency principles have begun to apply rather purely, even in 
the heavily regulated custody regime, through doctrines alternatively 
dubbed “provisional custody by mandate,” “custodial power of 
attorney,” or “standby guardianship.” In provisional custody by 
mandate, a parent with custody—or both parents, if married—
designate a mandatary or agent278 to “provide for the care, custody, 
and control of a minor child.”279 The agent’s authority is merely 
  
2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-364 (LexisNexis 
2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480 (West 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:23 
(2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23.2 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9 (West 2003); N.Y. 
DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2 
(West 2000 & Supp. 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3109.04 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112 (West 2001 & 
Supp. 2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.169 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); 23 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 5303 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (2006); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (1985 & Supp. 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45 (2004); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 
§ 153.002 (West 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, § 665 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2 (West 2001); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 26.10.100 (West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-101 (West 2004); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 767.41 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201 (2007).  
 275 See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131 (2009).  
 276 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 727 (2008) (“The Court shall not restrict 
the rights of a child or a parent under this subsection unless it finds, after a hearing, 
that the exercise of such rights would endanger a child’s physical health or 
significantly impair his or her emotional development.”).  
 277 See Dolgin, supra note 270, at 387-88 (“The invocation of Meyer and Pierce 
by the plurality in Troxel serves two contradictory ends. It reflects the law’s 
commitment to protect familial relationships from excessive state intervention that is 
presumed by revisionists to be the popular conception of Justice McReynolds’s decisions 
in those cases. But the invocation also reflects a vision of family that values hierarchy 
and the ‘isolation’ of the child from a community of extended kin.” (citing Barbara 
Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as 
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997-98 (1992))).  
 278 Mandate is the civil law’s terminology for the agency contract. See LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. art. 2989 (2009). In the mandate relationship, the person to whom 
authority is conferred is known as the mandatary, and the person conferring authority, 
as in the common law, is called the principal. Thus, “provisional custody by mandate” 
is nothing more than civilian terminology for the conference of custody by agency 
contract. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:951.  
 279 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:951. 
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temporary under these contractual delegations of custody.280 
Louisiana, which has perhaps the most detailed statutory scheme, 
allows a parent to grant custody to an agent by contract for a 
maximum period of one year and provides that the contract may 
terminate even earlier for prescribed causes, including revocation of 
agency authority, renunciation by the agent, or lapse of time after the 
death of the principal.281 Other states’ statutory schemes are less 
comprehensive but largely provide for the same contractual agency 
relationship. In the District of Columbia, a child’s parent may grant 
another person a “revocable custodial power of attorney” to provide 
for the child’s care.282 In Pennsylvania, standby guardianship rules—
which, in most states, act as a “springing guardianship” to allow a 
parent to name a guardian who will assume authority for a child only 
upon the parent’s death and after court approval283—extend to permit 
the mere written designation of a standby guardian to take effect 
immediately upon execution.284 The standby guardian can act as the 
guardian of the minor without the direction of the court for a period of 
sixty days, after which the guardian must file a petition for approval 
to continue.285 In each of these cases, then, parents confer the most 
sacred of rights to an agent by mere execution of a contract and 
without court oversight or control. 
Parents have used these rules to transfer temporary custody 
to agents, most frequently grandparents and aunts,286 for a variety of 
reasons ranging from illness and hospitalization to military 
deployments overseas to changes of residency for purposes of 
enrolling in a better public school.287 While the conferment of rights 
and duties as serious as those inherent in the parent-child 
relationship may seem inappropriately delegated through simple 
contract, the law recognizes such transfers out of perceived necessity. 
No other legal device allows parents to retain custody—and thereby 
avoid relinquishing it entirely on a permanent basis—while still 
  
 280 See, e.g., id. § 9:952.  
 281 Id.  
 282 D.C. CODE § 21-2301 (2007); see also Laura Weinrib, Kinship Care Reform: 
A Proposal for Consent Legislation in Massachusetts, 87 MASS. L. REV. 23, 23 n.6 (2002) 
(describing power of attorney’s use to “accommodate kinship caregivers”). 
 283 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1502 (West 2002).  
 284 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5612 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).  
 285 Id. § 5613 (West 2001).  
 286 See Lenore M. Molee, The Ultimate Demonstration of Love for a Child: 
Choosing a Standby Guardian New Jersey Standby Guardianship Act, 22 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 475, 496 (1998) (citing Carol Levine et al., In Whose Care and Custody? 
Placements and Policies for Children Whose Parents Die of AIDS, Final Report to the 
United Hospital Fund (The Orphan Project, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 7, 1994, at 4 
(recommending that the custodial parent select an individual known and trusted by the 
child, such as a grandparent or aunt)). 
 287 Greg Garland, Pointe Coupee to Amend Enrollment, ADVOCATE, May 12, 
2009, at 2B, available at http://2theadvocate.com/news/44759202.html?showAll=y&c=y. 
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providing for the care of a child when they cannot, or perhaps do not 
wish to, do so. 
Once again, equity permits the intrusion of agency principles 
into a bond perhaps even more intimate than that between spouses. 
Agency is even used in this context to create a relationship whereby a 
person exercises care, custody, and control over a minor child.  
Logic and consistency compel a reevaluation of the creation of 
a marital relationship through agency as well. Such a reevaluation is 
particularly appropriate considering that an agent exercising custody 
makes many significant and repeated decisions for the child’s welfare, 
typically unguided by the wishes of the principal. In the proxy 
marriage context, by contrast, the proxy makes no significant choices 
on behalf of the principal. The decision to enter into the marital 
relationship is made even before the proxy’s appointment and the 
proxy’s role is merely to serve as a stand-in to fulfill a form 
requirement. If agency has application in creating far more 
significant and personal custodial relationships, it should apply to 
create spousal relationships as well. 
C. Death by Agent 
At common law, it has been frequently observed that “no right 
is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than the right of 
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free 
from all restraint or interference of others.”288 The right to autonomy 
over one’s body is rooted in a constitutional right of privacy and has 
been held to extend to freedom in approving of or rejecting medical 
treatment.289 Consistent with that right, American courts in the last 
thirty years have gradually recognized an individual’s right not only 
to make medical decisions for himself, but to appoint an agent for 
that purpose, even where the decision making involves critical 
questions implicating life and death. 
Legal recognition of the applicability of agency principles in 
medical decision-making has come about rather slowly. Traditionally, 
agency doctrine could not apply to most health care situations in 
which it was truly needed. At common law, an agency relationship 
terminated automatically at the incapacity of the principal.290 Since 
the help of another in engaging in medical decision-making is 
  
 288 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
 289 Fowler, supra note 207, at 988-89. 
 290 MECHEM, supra note 14, § 677. For a justification of this rule, see id. § 676 
(“The act of every agent exercising a bare power or authority necessarily presupposes, 
as has been seen, the existence of a principal competent to perform the same act 
himself in his own behalf. It is his will that is being carried out through the medium of 
the agent. If for any reason, therefore, the principal becomes incapable of acting and 
exercising an intelligent will in regard to the transaction, it is evident that an essential 
element in the relation is lacking, and while that element remains absent, the further 
exercise of the relation must be suspended.”). 
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typically needed only when the interested party himself is 
incapacitated and thus unable to personally make those decisions,291 
prior agency appointments were virtually useless in conveying 
decision-making authority for critical health care matters.292 However, 
this result was not viewed as exceptionally problematic to scholars in 
the early twentieth century, as there was much speculation at the 
time that “medical decision-making might fall within [the] narrow 
category of actions too personal to be delegated.”293  
Beginning in the 1970s, however, the power of attorney was 
gradually revolutionized to allow agency authority to persist beyond 
the principal’s incapacity.294 States, and even the Uniform Probate 
Code in 1969, began to recognize the “durable power of attorney”—
durable in the sense that it would endure past the incapacity of the 
principal and up to the moment of his death.295 Such a power of 
attorney could, in accordance with the state law and the desires of the 
principal, either come into effect immediately upon execution or 
“spring” into effect upon the occurrence of a triggering event such as 
the principal’s incapacity,296 without the need for any court approval 
or proceeding.297 In either event, the durable power of attorney was a 
useful extension of traditional common law agency principles because 
it allowed the agent to continue to act with respect to the principal’s 
affairs—managing his finances and buying and selling property—
when the principal was unable to do so himself.298 As a result, the 
durable power of attorney has long been viewed as a logical and 
equitable extension of agency law insofar as it gives a trusted person 
exercising substituted judgment the authority to act in a manner that 
the principal likely would have desired.299 By 1984, the durable power 
of attorney was a part of the law in all fifty states.300  
Still, the clear extension of the durable power of attorney to 
medical decision-making has come about more slowly as a result of 
the perception that the authority to make life and death decisions on 
behalf of another might just be a “nondelegable” act outside the ambit 
of agency law.301 The concern, of course, is that the agent wields 
  
 291 Fowler, supra note 207, at 1012 n.174. 
 292 Id. at 1014-15. 
 293 Id. at 1009. 
 294 Id. at 1012 n.174.  
 295 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-501 (amended 2008). 
 296 Legal Problems of the Aged and Infirm—The Durable Power of Attorney—
Planned Protective Services and the Living Will, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 3 (1978). 
 297 Id. 
 298 Id. at 7. 
 299 Fowler, supra note 207, at 1002 (“[T]he agency approach would permit the 
patient to choose the person he most trusts to represent his interests—someone who 
shares, or would at least be faithful to, the patient’s views . . . .”). 
 300 Id. at 1009. 
 301 Id. at 1009-10. 
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“extraordinary power” in these circumstances,302 and “the basic policy 
underlying the nondelegable acts doctrine is that some decisions 
should be made personally—or not made at all.”303 Even in the wake of 
the creation of the durable power of attorney, agency scholars and 
lawyers questioned whether health care decisions were of the sort 
that simply should not be made at all if they could not be made by the 
affected person himself.304 
Today, the power of attorney has evolved such that it is clear it 
may be used as a device to permit the appointment of an agent for 
medical decision-making.305 Despite the intimate nature of the choices 
made by the agent in the face of the principal’s incapacity, the right to 
make such choices is now widely recognized as falling within agency 
authority.306 The history of the durable power of attorney itself helped 
states reach that conclusion. It is evident from writings of the 
committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws—the committee charged with drafting a model durable 
power of attorney law—that the purpose of its creation was to provide 
incompetents with “assistance in caring for their property rights or 
  
 302 Id. at 1007. 
 303 Id. at 1010. 
 304 Id. at 1009. 
 305 Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have statutes specifically 
authorizing health-care powers of attorney while six others allow medical decision-
making authority under a general durable power of attorney. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.010 
(2005); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2430-2444 (West 1993 & Supp. 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 15-14-501 to -502 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 81-43 (West 2004 & Supp. 
2008); D.C. CODE §§ 21-2201 to -2213 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (West 2007); GA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-1 to -13 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-4501 to 
-4509 (2007); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 110½, §§ 804-1 to -12 (West 2002); IND. CODE 
ANN. §§ 30-5-1 to -10 (West 1994 & Supp. 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144B.1-.12 (West 
2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-625 to -632 (2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.970-.986 
(West 2006); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2997 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 5-501 
(1998 & Supp. 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D, §§ 1-17 (West 1998 & Supp. 
2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.496 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§§ 41-41-151 to -183 (West 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 404.700-.735 (West 2001 & Supp. 
2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 449.800-.860 (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-
J:1 to -J:16 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008); 1991 N.J. Laws 1367; N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 45-5-501 to -502 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2980-2994 
(McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2010); 1991 N.D. Laws ch. 266 (H.B. 1384); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 1337.11-.17 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.505-.585 
(West 2009); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5607 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.10-1 to -2 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-66-10 to -80 (2002 & Supp. 
2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-12C-1 to -8 (2004 & Supp. 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§§ 34-6-201 to -214 (West 2007); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 44590h-1 (West 2006); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
14, § 3451 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-134.4 (West 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 11.94.010-.900 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-30A-1 to -20 
(West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 155.01-.80 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 33-5-201 (2007). 
 306 See supra text accompanying note 255. 
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personal affairs, or for protecting their property or personal rights.”307 
Slowly, the view has come to predominate that the drafters of durable-
power-of-attorney statutes must have contemplated the making of 
health care decisions as precisely one of those acts for which authority 
could be, and most often would be, conveyed to an agent.308  
There is no doubt that the decisions made by an agent under 
a durable power of attorney, at least with regard to the health care of 
the principal, are complex and personal. The agent needs to “assess 
risks and costs, speak to friends and relatives . . . , consider a variety 
of therapeutic options, seek the opinions of other physicians, evaluate 
the . . . condition and prospects for recovery”—in short, make exactly 
the kind of tough choices the principal himself would be required to 
make absent the power of attorney.309 Still, the law has come to 
recognize the principal’s right to select a proxy to speak for him in 
making life and death decisions. Where the charge placed upon the 
agent would be much less severe—merely carrying out a form 
requirement rather than making critical decisions—the same 
possibilities should be extended to principals seeking to perfect 
ceremonial marriage requirements by proxy. 
III. THE EVOLVING CASE FOR PROXY MARRIAGE310 
A. Equitable Necessity in the Twenty-First Century 
The legality of proxy marriage certainly seems to be nothing 
more than an academic inquiry. After all, marrying with the use of 
representatives is exceptionally unromantic.311 And in an age in which 
marriage is viewed almost exclusively as the outcome of romantic 
love,312 one might assume that so few couples would choose to marry 
by proxy that its legality would be almost irrelevant. In fact, precisely 
the opposite is true. Contemporary demand for proxy marriage is 
startlingly strong, brought about in large part by the many 
advantages afforded to married persons that their unmarried 
counterparts do not share. 
  
 307 Fowler, supra note 207, at 1016 (citing MODEL SPECIAL POWER OF 
ATTORNEY FOR SMALL PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT (1964), reprinted in NAT’L CONF. OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE MEETING 273 (1964) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]). 
 308 See HANDBOOK, supra note 307, at 275.  
 309 Fowler, supra note 207, at 1001. 
 310 The inspiration for this title was drawn from Marvin Moore’s 1962 piece 
entitled The Case for Proxy Marriage, cited supra note 16. 
 311 See Jennifer H. Svan, Married in Montana: Servicemembers Take 
Advantage of State’s Double-Proxy Law, STARS & STRIPES (May 26, 2009), 
http://www.stripes.com/articleprint.asp?section=104&article=62928. 
 312 See COTT, supra note 20, at 150.  
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1. The Groups That Stand to Benefit from Proxy Marriage 
In Montana, the only American state to allow marriages by 
double proxy,313 county officials were so overwhelmed with proxy-
marriage applications—nearly thirty per month in Flathead County 
alone—that they changed state law in 2007 to restrict proxy marriage 
to situations in which one spouse is either a Montana resident or a 
member of the armed forces.314 County clerks complained that they 
simply could not otherwise handle the sheer volume of proxy-
marriage requests.315 The change may not have brought about its 
intended effect. Three years later, even with a very narrow proxy-
marriage rule, Montana officials in Flathead County report that they 
process as many as eighty double proxy marriages each month.316 
Demand for proxy marriage among American citizens is 
strong, brought about, in large part, by the sheer number of armed 
forces stationed away from home. That number approached 300,000 
in 2008.317 While at first blush that figure seems to pale in comparison 
to the four million men that served in the armed forces during World 
War I,318 the lengthy duration of America’s continued occupation of 
Afghanistan and Iraq means that the number of troops who have 
served abroad in the last decade is approaching the number serving 
during the period when proxy marriage was viewed as a necessity.319 
Of course, military personnel are not the only group for whom 
proxy marriage might be an attractive option. Any couple separated 
by a substantial distance might find the doctrine useful. In fact, the 
history of Montana’s proxy-marriage law demonstrates that it grew 
not out of a demand among members of the armed forces, but rather 
from an influx of miners to the Montana area in the 1860s; they 
typically came from out of state and desired to wed their “far-flung 
fiancées.”320 Today, and particularly in the current troubled economy, 
far more Americans are forced to seek employment and remain far 
from home or their significant others for a lengthy period.321 
Thousands of American citizens find themselves in such a situation, 
  
 313 MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-301 (2009).  
 314 Maurice Possley, Marriage by Proxy Booming in Montana, MONT. LAW., 
June/July 2007, at 32. 
 315 Id.  
 316 Svan, supra note 311 (“Flathead County district court processes from six to 
20 double proxy marriage licenses per week . . . .”).  
 317 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY 
REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (2008), available at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/ 
personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0803.pdf.  
 318 See Gordon, supra note 91, at 32. 
 319 Rod Powers, The Cost of War, ABOUT.COM (Jun. 19, 2010), http://usmilitary. 
about.com/od/terrorism/a/iraqdeath1000.htm (describing the duration of United States’ 
military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq). 
 320 Svan, supra note 311. 
 321 See Broadway, supra note 22, at 112-14; Government Jobs Overview, supra 
note 24. See generally Briffault, supra note 21. 
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and while the number of those persons desiring to perfect a proxy 
marriage is certainly just a small fraction of those who work away 
from home, modern employment conditions, namely, increasing long-
distance employment over the last century, have no doubt 
significantly bolstered demand for proxy marriage.322 
Finally, the number of same-sex individuals in committed 
relationships, who often desire the rights and responsibilities of 
marriage, and who might take advantage of proxy rules in a state 
allowing same-sex marriage, has also increased dramatically since 
proxy marriage was born in this country.323 In the 1920s and 1930s, 
gay and lesbian culture was just beginning to take hold in the United 
States.324 Today, there are reportedly 710,000 acknowledged 
homosexual Americans,325 and the 2010 census figures are expected to 
report a substantial increase in the number of those persons involved 
in committed relationships.326 Because gay and lesbian couples can 
legally marry in only a few American jurisdictions, their sole option 
for perfecting a valid marriage is to endure the hardship of traveling 
to a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex marriage and does not 
restrict its application to residents.327 
Constituents of all of the above-described groups are likely to 
desire to marry by proxy at levels not yet seen before, stemming from 
the fact that they cannot perfect a ceremonial marriage. The 
availability of the proxy-marriage option would confer a panoply of 
advantages that no other legal status can bring, both to the spouses 
themselves and to their children.328 
  
 322 Jennifer Levitz, Unemployed Hit the Road to Find Jobs, WSJ.COM (June 
25, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124587593994649417.html. 
 323 The 1990 census in Minnesota counted gay couples for the first time and, 
by 2000, nearly 10,000 gay couples statewide were living in Minnesota; many already 
considered themselves to be married simply by cohabitation. By 2007, that number had 
increased to 13,000. Jason Hoppin, Same-Sex Couples Glad to be Counted in U.S. 
Census, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Mar. 15, 2010, at A1. See Lavery, supra note 
27 (describing how “e-marriage” may be beneficial to same-sex couples); see also 
Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 27.  
 324 MARY BETH NORTON ET AL., A PEOPLE AND A NATION: A HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES: SINCE 1865, at 641 (2009).  
 325 2000 Census Information on Gay and Lesbian Couples, GAY DEMOGRAPHICS, 
http://www.gaydemographics.org/USA/USA.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).  
 326 Hoppin, supra note 323. 
 327 Even this strategy may prove ineffective in giving gay and lesbian couples the 
legal advantages they desire. The federal Defense of Marriage Act allows states to refuse 
recognition of a same-sex marriage valid in the place of perfection. Mary L. Bonauto, DOMA 
Damages Same Sex Families and Their Children, 32 FAM. ADVOC. 10, 11-12 (2010). Thus, 
upon returning to a home state that does not permit same-sex marriage, the couples 
described would not have gained much in the way of legal advantage.  
 328 See NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS: THE SOCIAL 
HEALTH OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 22 (July 2007). 
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2. The Benefits of Proxy Marriage 
Perhaps foremost among the rights a party might seek 
through a proxy marriage are immigration benefits. A controversial 
English case that recently made headlines provides an instructive 
example. Two English residents, a Polish citizen and a Brazilian 
citizen, were married by double proxy in Brazil while they remained 
in London.329 The marriage made the Brazilian husband the spouse of 
a European Union citizen, thus granting him the right to remain in 
England permanently.330 British immigration officials acknowledged 
the validity of the couple’s proxy marriage in Brazil but argued that 
the couple had used proxy marriage to circumvent English 
immigration policy,331 which would have denied immigration effects to 
a marriage perfected in England because the intended husband was 
in the country on only a temporary visa.332 Immigration officials 
essentially bemoaned the spouses taking advantage of what they 
described as a “loophole” in immigration policy by engaging in a proxy 
marriage.333 When the husband was denied United Kingdom resident 
status, he sued, arguing that a refusal to grant him residency violated 
his human rights.334 A lower court immigration judge agreed, and the 
House of Lords ended the controversy in late 2008 when it ruled that 
further investigating the motives of the couple’s Brazilian proxy 
marriage would be a breach of their human rights.335 The parties to 
this proxy marriage insisted that their marriage is “genuine” and “not 
a sham,” and that they strongly desired to marry but simply could not 
bear the cost and complication of traveling to Poland or Brazil to do 
so.336 Proxy marriage was their only option—and an option that 
conferred substantial immigration advantages on the husband. 
In a high-profile case closer to home, an American resident 
claimed permanent resident status based on a proxy marriage to a 
deceased Marine.337 Hotaru Ferschke, a Japanese citizen, married an 
American serviceman by proxy in Japan after he deployed for service 
  
 329 See Dan Newling, The Wedding with No Bride and No Groom as Brazilian 
Marries Pole “By Proxy” to Stay in Britain, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 12, 2008), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1094306/The-wedding-bride-groom-Pole-Brazilian-
marry-proxy-stay-Britain.html.  
 330 Id.  
 331 Id. 
 332 Visitors of the UK are not permitted to apply for a visa on the basis of 
marriage if not a European citizen, not married to a person present, and not settled in the 
UK. See Fiancé/e of an UK Citizen, Permanent Resident or EU Citizen, 
WORKPERMIT.COM, http://www.workpermit.com/uk/fiance.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). 
 333 Newling, supra note 329. 
 334 Id. 
 335 Id.  
 336 Id.  
 337 See Kristin M. Hall, Proxy Wedding Means Marine’s Widow, Baby 
Unwelcome, KNOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2009/ 
sep/17/proxy-wedding-means-marines-widow-baby-unwelcome.  
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in Iraq and she learned she was pregnant with his child.338 One month 
after the proxy marriage, Ferschke’s husband was killed during a 
house raid in Iraq.339 Ferschke sought to obtain permanent residency 
in the United States for herself and her son, as the spouse and child 
of an American citizen.340 The federal government denied her request 
because the parties’ marriage was perfected by proxy.341 And while the 
United States government recognizes, for immigration purposes, 
proxy marriages valid in the jurisdiction in which they were 
contracted, it imposes the additional requirement of consummation 
before a proxy marriage can confer immigration status.342 Because 
Ferschke and her husband did not live together or engage in sexual 
activity after their marriage, she was denied permanent residency.343 
Immigration officials have expressed distress over the case, noting 
the sacrifices of Ferschke’s family for this country, but believe the law 
allows no other outcome.344 Ferschke sought the help of three United 
States congressmen, who introduced a private bill to aid her.345 That 
bill passed in the House on November 15, 2010, but it is unknown 
when or if the Senate will act.346 Ferschke’s status remains 
unresolved.347 She returned to Japan in January 2010.348 
It is obvious from the Ferschke story that not all attempts to 
use proxy marriage to obtain immigration advantages are successful. 
Still, the two stories together demonstrate the potential advantages 
of a proxy marriage to better the immigration status of foreign 
residents, often in deserving cases.  
In addition to immigration status, marriage confers a 
staggering array of property rights upon the parties to it. The right to 
succeed from a deceased spouse who leaves no will,349 the right to an 
  
 338 Id.  
 339 Id.; see also Charlie Reed & Chiyomi Sumida, Immigration Law Aimed at 
Troops’ Foreign Spouses Passes House, STARS & STRIPES (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www. 
stripes.com/news/pacific/immigration-law-aimed-at-troops-foreign-spouses-passes-house-
1.125703. 
 340 Hall, supra note 337.  
 341 Id.  
 342 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (2006); see also SARAH IGNATIUS & ELISABETH S. 
STICKNEY, NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW & FAMILY § 4:13 (2009). Some 
states, even outside the immigration context, require consummation of a marriage on 
penalty of nullity. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1 (2010). 
 343 Hall, supra note 337.  
 344 Id.  
 345 Robert Norris, Marine Widow Ferschke and Son, ‘Mikey,’ Return to Japan, 
THEDAILYTIMES.COM (Jan. 6, 2010), http://www.thedailytimes.com/article/20100106/ 
NEWS/301069985. 
 346 See Marine Sergeant Michael H. Ferschke, Jr. Memorial Act, H.R. 3697, 
111th Cong. (2010), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-6397. 
 347 See id.; see also Reed & Sumida, supra note 339. 
 348 Norris, supra note 345. 
 349 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (amended 2008). 
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elective share when a spouse dies with a will,350 life insurance 
benefits, pension payments, health insurance coverage, and a whole 
host of other entitlements are given to spouses alone.351 In the 
military context, there are a number of more particular advantages 
provided to spouses of active-duty servicemembers, particularly when 
they are killed in combat.352 For instance, the United States 
government pays a “death gratuity” of $100,000 to the surviving 
spouse of a member of the armed forces who dies on active duty.353 
Both inside and outside the military context, then, marriage provides 
substantial property entitlements to its parties. And when they are 
unable to undergo a ceremonial marriage because of impossibility or 
exceptional inconvenience, proxy marriage is the only means of 
conferring the advantages of marriage that both parties so desire. 
Finally, children may have much at stake in the recognition of 
their parents’ proxy marriage. While children born both inside and 
outside of marriage are now generally recognized, on constitutional 
grounds, to have the same rights and duties vis-à-vis their parents,354 
the ease with which they may assert these rights still differs based on 
their parents’ marital status.355 Children born during the marriage of 
their parents, or within a reasonable period after the dissolution of 
their parents’ marriage, enjoy a legal presumption of filiation.356 The 
child born to a married American servicemember on duty overseas, 
for instance, would not have to suffer the expense and inconvenience 
of proving paternity before receiving legal recognition as the 
  
 350 See id. § 2-202. 
 351 Spouses of military servicemembers, for example, are entitled to the 
following benefits: Death Gratuity (a one-time non-taxable payment to help surviving 
family members deal with the financial hardships that accompany the loss of a 
servicemember); Veteran’s Death Pension (pension for surviving spouses of deceased 
veterans); Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (a monthly benefit paid to eligible 
survivors of certain deceased veterans); Survivors’ and Dependents’ Education 
Assistance Program (provides education and training opportunities to eligible 
dependents of certain veterans; offers up to forty-five months of education benefits; 
benefits may be used for degree and certificate programs, apprenticeship, and on-the-
job training); Gold Star Lapel Button (widows and widowers entitled to Gold Star Lapel 
Button); Survivor Health and Dental Benefits (surviving spouses can continue to 
receive health and dental benefits); TRICARE Eligibility (a health benefit program). 
See Understanding Survivor Benefits, MILITARY.COM, http://www.military.com/benefits/ 
survivor-benefits (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). 
 352 See id. 
 353 See Death Gratuity, MILITARY.COM, http://www.military.com/benefits/ 
survivor-benefits/death-gratuity (last visited Oct. 3, 2010). 
 354 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (holding that a provision of the 
Illinois Probate Act which allowed children born outside of marriage to inherit by 
intestate succession from their mothers only, although children born of a marriage may 
inherit by intestate succession from both parents, denies equal protection to children 
born outside of marriage). 
 355 But see Tricare Eligibility, MILITARY.COM, http://www.military/com/ 
benefits/tricare/tricare-elibility (some military health insurance benefits may be 
available to children born outside of marriage) (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). 
 356 See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 185 (2009). 
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servicemember’s descendant. The law would presume him the 
servicemember’s son and treat him as such unless a party with a 
contrary interest proved otherwise.357 But the protections of a filiative 
presumption depend upon marriage of the child’s parents. And again, 
when parents are unable to perfect a ceremonial marriage, a proxy 
marriage may be the only means of creating presumptions that aid 
children in establishing the parent-child relationship. 
In short, the need for a narrow doctrine legalizing proxy 
marriage is great, brought about by a more geographically diverse 
society. Law- and policymakers must recognize that a changing 
culture demands a new look at whether rules that exclude the use of 
agents in the marriage ceremony continue to effect equity in the 
twenty-first century. 
B. The Protective Mechanisms of the Power of Attorney 
Perhaps one of the most significant obstacles that has 
prevented American courts and legislatures from widely recognizing 
the validity of proxy marriages all these years is nothing more than 
fear. Fear of the limitations of agency to effect justice in an intimate 
context is palpable. As one scholar has noted, “there is always the 
possibility that an agent will make an irrational decision that 
needlessly” harms the principal.358 Fear of the application of agency 
principles to the marriage contract should not overshadow the 
potential for equitable gains, however. General agency law includes a 
multitude of mechanisms designed to protect both principals and 
agents, which are particularly helpful when analyzed in the marital 
context.359 Moreover, the basic principles of agency can be slightly 
tailored with little difficulty where necessary to better fit the 
marriage contract. Essentially, by divesting the proxy of nearly all 
discretion and requiring exceptional specificity in a writing creating 
the agency relationship, a regime can be created that permits proxy 
marriage but, at the same time, allays the fears that have posed 
hurdles to its recognition for so many years. 
1. The Straightjacket of Form 
As a general matter, agency relationships need not be created 
in writing.360 The principal-agent relationship, which is a contractual 
one, may come about by mere oral agreement or perhaps even 
tacitly.361 Nonetheless, the law has long recognized the need for more 
solemnity in the creation of an agency relationship for certain 
  
 357 Id. 
 358 Fowler, supra note 207, at 1005. 
 359 See infra Parts III.B.1-4. 
 360 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.02 cmt. b (2006).  
 361 See id. § 3.01. 
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significant transactions.362 The common law equal-dignity rule 
appropriately regulates the form necessary for a document creating 
an agency relationship by requiring the power of attorney to be in 
writing if a writing is required for the underlying transaction for 
which the agent is given authority to act.363 Therefore, a power of 
attorney to alienate property on behalf of the principal or bind the 
principal as a surety must be in writing and must expressly confer 
authority to undertake specific action rather than generally grant the 
agent responsibility for handling all the affairs of the principal.364 
Some states have gone beyond the pure common law formulation of 
the equal-dignity rule to require that the agency contract not only be 
in writing, but also in whatever particular form is required of the 
underlying transaction.365 Still others require particular types of 
agency contracts to assume the law’s highest form requirements; the 
durable power of attorney, for instance, frequently must be executed 
before a notary and two witnesses.366 
In the marriage context, application of the most restrictive 
equal-dignity rule would lead to absurd results. Requiring a power of 
attorney for a proxy marriage to be perfected before a qualified 
officiant, typically a religious official or judicial officer,367 for instance, 
makes little sense. The law has recognized as much in the corporate 
context or “when an agent acts only as an amanuensis who signs at 
the principal’s request,” where the equal-dignity doctrine has been set 
aside as illogical.368  
  
 362 The power of attorney is the “written instrument by which one person . . . 
confirms the authority of another . . . to perform specified actions on [his] behalf.” 
Fowler, supra note 207, at 1013-14. It is not a prerequisite to the creation of an agency 
relationship, but it “serves as an objective manifestation to third parties that such an 
agency has been created.” Id. at 1014.  
 363 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.02 cmt. b (2006); see also Wendell H. 
Holmes & Symeon C. Symeonides, Representation, Mandate & Agency: A Kommentar 
on Louisiana’s New Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 1122 (1999). 
 364 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.02 cmt. b.  
 365 Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 363, at 1122. 
 366 RICHARD C. MILSTEIN, THE FLORIDA BAR, FLORIDA WILLS (FOR MODEST 
ESTATES), POWERS OF ATTORNEY, AND HEALTH CARE ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 84 (2007). 
 367 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:202 (2008) (“A marriage ceremony may be 
performed by (1) A priest, minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, or 
any clergyman of any religious sect, who is authorized by the authorities of his religion 
to perform marriages, and who is registered to perform marriages; (2) A state judge or 
justice of the peace.”). 
 368 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.02 cmt. c. For example, corporate 
officers are agents who enter into transactions on behalf of the corporation. However, 
corporate officers typically are granted authority to act on the corporation’s behalf in 
the articles of incorporation, by-laws, or a board resolution. It would thus be illogical 
and cumbersome to apply the equal-dignity doctrine and require an individual writing 
granting authority for nearly every act undertaken by the agent. See id.  
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Still, the evidentiary and cautionary functions of ceremonial 
marriage requirements369 could be served by requiring that a power of 
attorney to marry be executed in writing, at a minimum. Requiring 
even more—the presence of a notary or witnesses—would also be 
consistent with agency principles in the intimate area of the durable 
power of attorney370 and would be a reasonable demand to make of 
those desiring to perfect a proxy marriage.371 
2. Specificity and Duration Limitations 
Form requirements aside, a number of foreign jurisdictions 
that sanction proxy marriage have imposed additional mandates on a 
power of attorney to marry that the United States could borrow in a 
manner consistent with American agency principles. Most Central 
and South American countries, for example, require that the “other 
party to the marriage . . . be clearly and unmistakably designated by 
name in the document appointing the proxy [and] that the marriage 
can be concluded with this person only and with nobody else.”372 Other 
jurisdictions require a specification of the “place, day, and hour 
designated for the celebration of the marriage.”373 Some countries even 
  
 369 See John H. Wade, Void and De Facto Marriages, 9 SYDNEY L. REV. 356, 
360 (1981) (“Courts dealing with property disputes had for centuries before 1753 
suggested that a ceremonial marriage was far easier to prove in court than merely a de 
facto one. Thus then, as today, formalized marriages were especially desirable for 
evidentiary reasons. But ethics certainly played at least a subsidiary role in the 
emergence of the legal requirement of ceremony. For public ceremony hopefully gave 
time for reflection about the serious nature of marriage, perhaps delayed impulsive 
passion, scared off fortune hunters in search of heiresses, and allowed time for social 
approval and advice.”). But see D.E. Engdahl, Medieval Metaphysics and English 
Marriage Law, 8 J. FAM. L. 381, 382 (1968) (arguing that validity requirements in 
marriage laws are often barriers to justice).  
 370 See MILSTEIN, supra note 366, at 84. 
 371 Mexican law currently requires that a grant of agency authority to marry 
be made before a notary and two witnesses. CÓDIGO CIVIL FEDERAL art. 44 (Mex.), 
translated in FEDERAL CIVIL CODE OF MEXICO, supra note 192, at 17. 
 372 Schwelb, supra note 37, at 368. But see id. (describing Islamic law, wherein 
the proxy is given authority even to choose the bride for the principal). 
 373 See CÓDIGO DE LA FAMILIA art. 47 (Pan.), translated in CIVIL CODE OF 
PANAMA, supra note 189, at 294-95 (“Marriage can be contracted by the appearance 
before the official and two witnesses, without legal impediment, by one of the parties 
and the person to whom the other party has awarded a special power of attorney, by 
notarial act; provided that the person that is domiciled or is a resident at the place of 
officiating of the official that is to celebrate the marriage is always necessary. The 
power of attorney must express the name of the person with whom the marriage is to 
be performed, and basic informational facts for identifying the person, and the 
marriage shall be valid unless the revocation of the power of attorney has been given to 
the empowered agent, in due form, prior to the celebration of the marriage.”); CÓDIGO 
CIVIL FEDERAL art. 102 (Mex.), translated in FEDERAL CIVIL CODE OF MEXICO, supra 
note 192, at 17 (“The parties or their specially empowered agents, constituted in the 
manner provided in Article 44, as well as two witnesses to each of the parties that 
verify their identity, must be present before the Civil Registry judge at the place, day 
and hour designated for the celebration of the marriage . . . .”). 
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limit the maximum duration of a power of attorney to marry to a 
relatively short period.374 In Italy, for instance, a proxy marriage must 
be celebrated within 180 days of the grant of agency authority.375 Such 
specificity and duration restrictions would allow American courts to 
recognize the equitable need for proxy marriage while, at the same 
time, limiting the breadth of the authority granted to the agent. 
3. The Possibility of Revocation 
Principles of revocation, which may arise in any agency 
contract, can also play a role in protecting principals to proxy 
marriages. An agency contract is typically revocable at the will of the 
principal,376 and this general rule should apply in the marital context 
as well. Indeed, scholars have long observed that the revocable nature 
of the power of attorney is a consideration that strongly militates 
against legally recognizing proxy marriage.377 The worry is that the 
ability of the principal to revoke his proxy’s authority at any time 
may result in marriages that do not meet with the principal’s 
changed desires.378  
Agency law is already well equipped to deal with the familiar 
problem of revocation, however. Because a revocation may have 
substantial effects on third parties, it is not effective in withdrawing 
the agent’s authority until the agent receives notice of the 
revocation.379 The burden placed upon the principal is slight; he must 
simply communicate his change of heart to the agent before the hour 
he designated for his act arrives.380 In the marital context, the 
application of this general rule adequately protects the principal, who 
would be bound only to marriages to which he specifically consented 
and that were contracted before he gave his duly appointed agent 
notice of his changed intent. 
  
  This form of regulation is not wholly unknown to American law, as agency 
theorists have long distinguished between “general agents” and “special agents,” the 
latter being authorized to conduct only a single transaction on the principal’s behalf. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. d. 
 374 See supra note 182. 
 375 CODICE CIVILE art. 111 (It.); see also THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE AND 
COMPLEMENTARY LEGISLATION (Mario Beltramo, Giovanni E. Longo & John H. 
Merryman trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2009) (1991). 
 376 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.06. 
 377 See Apt (otherwise Magnus) v. Apt, [1947] P.D. 127 (Eng.), available at 
1947 WL 10609; Recent Cases, 10 B.U. L. REV. 378, 403 (1930). 
 378 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 15 (2009). 
 379 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.10. 
 380 Spain’s proxy marriage legislation provides a contemporary example of the 
application of agency revocation principles in the marital context. CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 87 
(Spain), translated in WALTON, supra note 199, at 141 (agency power “shall be valid if, 
before [the marriage’s] celebration, the person so authorized should not have been 
notified in an authentic form of the revocation of power”). 
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4. The Discretionless Power of Attorney 
The confines of American agency law are, in all of the ways 
set out above, already well designed to serve the parties to a proxy 
marriage. The specificity that could be required in the power of 
attorney and the fact that all the agent really does is stand-in to meet 
a form requirement means that the “proxy” in a proxy marriage is not 
a proxy, or true agent, at all. Rather, “[t]he proxy is . . . nothing but a 
messenger, a ‘porte-parole,’ ‘nuntius,’ ‘Bote.’ He has no authority 
whatsoever to inject himself into the legal sphere of the party who 
appointed him. The proxy’s own will does not enter into the picture.”381 
The role of the proxy and the power of attorney’s protective 
mechanisms provide comfort, then, in ensuring that entry into one of 
the law’s most intimate relationships is made by will and intention of 
the principal himself. And because the law already sanctions the 
application of agency principles in other intimate areas—including 
will-making, transferring child custody, and creating durable powers 
of attorney—all of which give the agent substantially more decision-
making authority than proxy marriage,382 the modest role of an agent 
in a proxy marriage should be easily tolerated. 
IV. TOWARD A WEDDING WITH NO BRIDE AND NO GROOM383 
Proxy marriage fails to conform well to today’s wedding fairy 
tale. It requires none of the trappings that have come to be considered 
traditional.384 At best, it is a wholly unromantic way to perfect the 
contract of marriage. But it is a useful, even necessary, avenue to 
marriage for many couples that want to undertake the lifetime of 
rights and duties associated with marriage but are unable to fulfill 
typical ceremonial marriage requirements. 
Fear and consternation associated with a departure from 
strict adherence to the requirements of traditional ceremonial 
marriage is misplaced. By allowing common law marriage, the law in 
many American jurisdictions has already gone rather far in creating 
inroads to the requirement that a marriage be celebrated formally 
with both spouses physically present in the same room at the same 
  
 381 Schwelb, supra note 37, at 368. “Porte-parole” is French for “spokesman, 
mouthpiece.” J.E. MANSION, 2 HARRAP’S NEW STANDARD FRENCH AND ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 77 (R.P.L. Ledesert & Margaret Ledesert eds., 1973). “Nuntius” is Latin 
for “messenger, bearer of news.” LEXICON OF THE LATIN LANGUAGE 578 (F.P. Leverett 
ed., 1850). “Bote” is German for “messenger, courier, bearer.” GERMAN-ENGLISH 
ENGLISH-GERMAN DICTIONARY 126 (Cassell’s rev. ed. 1978). 
 382 See supra Part II. 
 383 Inspiration for this title was drawn from Newling, supra note 329. 
 384 But see Dan Barry, Trading Vows in Montana, No Couple Required, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2008, at A11 (describing the “sugary vows written by the absentee 
bride and groom” that two Montana proxies once delivered to each other). 
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time.385 Allowing spouses to celebrate a marriage with the assistance 
of agents is perhaps even less troubling, particularly considering that 
the law already endorses the use of agents in other intimate 
transactions, such as will-making, transferring child custody, and 
even making end-of-life decisions. In fact, we often view agency law 
as designed to do precisely what we fear in the marriage context, 
namely, allow the principal to authorize an agent to act for him in a 
significant, often personal, transaction.386 
Creating symmetry in agency law by sanctioning proxy 
marriage is simply the next logical step in the evolution of agency law 
as applied to intimate relationships. It is a step that can be taken 
confidently, given that the agent in a proxy marriage may be granted 
far less discretion and decision-making responsibility than he is 
afforded in other personal dealings, and given the strong foundation 
of protection that American agency rules already affords principals 
through form requirements, duration restrictions, and revocation 
rules. In short, agency principles are ripe for application to the 
contract of marriage, and the idea of a proxy marriage—a groomless, 
perhaps even brideless, wedding—should be embraced. 
  
 385 See supra note 9. 
 386 Fowler, supra note 207, at 1016 (describing the creation of a national 
committee to study ways in which a power of attorney might aid individuals in 
managing their most personal affairs).  
